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 1 Introduction 
 
 
Expansion investments of firms are the engine of the economic growth of nations. 
In the last decades two types of expansion projects were key elements of the strategic 
management decisions and shaped the world’s economic development significantly. On the 
one hand an increasing share of investment expenditures has been spent on the development 
of new technologies and products. On the other hand more and more firms focused on the 
acquisition of new markets and new customers and entered new geographical markets as part 
of the intensifying globalisation process. 
 
The economic literature analysing the capital budgeting decisions of firms originally involves 
two different groups of theories1. The first category applies decision theoretic principles and 
models the investment decision of individual firms in isolation. The second group applies 
game theoretic models and derives optimal investment strategy of investors with respect to 
the actions of their competitors 
The application of option pricing for capital budgeting decisions started with Myers (1977)2. 
Basic models for analysing the investments in real assets using continuous time real option 
frameworks were developed by Cukierman (1980)3, Bernanke (1983)4 Kester (1984), Brennan 
& Schwartz (1985)5 and by McDonald and Siegel (1986)6. The results of McDonald and 
Siegel revealed already an explicit expression for the option value of waiting to invest, with 
the investments depending on the model’s parameters.  
The practical application of basic real option models has been analysed in various ways by 
different authors, e.g. Trigeorgis and Mason (1987)7, Tirole (1988)8, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1996)9, Kulatilaka & Perotti (1998)10. However; most of these extensions regard the 
investment decision of firms in isolation, ignoring strategic interactions with rivals.
                                                 
1The categories originate from Huisman, K.J.M., 2001 Technology Investment: A Game Theoretical Real Option 
Approach. Kluwer Academic Publisher, Boston  
2Myers, S.C. ,1977 Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 
3Cukierman, A., 1980 The effects of Uncertainty on Investment under Risk Neutrality with Endogenous 
Information, Journal of Political Economy  
4Bernanke, B.S., 1983, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment, Quarterly Journal of Economics  
5Brennan, M.J.& Schwartz, E.S., 1985 Evaluating Natural Resource Investment, Journal of Business 
6McDonald, R. & Siegel, D., 1986 The Value of Waiting to Invest, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
7Trigeorgis, L. & Mason, S.P., 1987 Valuing Managerial Flexibility, Midland Corporate Finance Journal 5 
8Tirole, J., 1998 The Theory of Industrial Organisation, Cambridge, MA MIT Press 
9Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, S.R., 1994 Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press 
10Kulatilaka, N., Perotti, E. C., 1998 Strategic Growth Options, Management Science  
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Reinganum (1981)11 and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) 12 were among the first presenting how 
competition among rivals leads to preemption and rent equalization in case of new technology 
adoption. Smets (1991)13 developed one of the first real option models incorporating the 
strategic interaction of firms. The basic assumption, that the profit flow of one firm depends 
on the investment decision of his competitors, gave the result that the investment occurs 
sooner than the standard real option framework would suggest. Extending the basic model, 
Grenadier (1996)14 modelled the cycles in the real estate development industry, Lambrecht 
(2001)15 presented the impact of debt financing on market entry and exit decision of firms, 
while Kort, Huisman, Pawlina and Thijssen (2004)16 analysed the introduction of new 
technology in the case of two firms already competing with each other in a given market.  
 
Despite the intensifying globalisation process of the last decades, a relatively small amount of 
research work has been devoted to the geographical market entry analysis of firms. Much of 
the strategic management literature analysed the impact of entry timing on the later 
performance of companies and only a limited amount of research has been dedicated to the 
understanding of factors which determine the entry decisions in new geographical markets. 
On the other hand extensive research has already been carried out on the field of 
understanding the factors influencing technology investments and timing of product 
innovation and introduction. However a relatively small amount of analysis and research has 
been done to adapt these results to the geographical market entry decision of firms.17 
In the late 80ties Eastern European countries opened up their borders and made it possible for 
foreign investors to enter new virtually untapped markets in Eastern Europe.  
The general macroeconomic parameters of Eastern European countries varied significantly 
after the fall of the communist regimes (1989) both in absolute terms (e.g. population, 
                                                 
11Reinganum, J., 1981 On the Diffusion of New Technology, Bell Journal of Economics 
12Fudenberg, D., and Tirole, J., 1985 Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology, 
Review of Economic Studies  
13Smets, F. 1991, Exporting versus FDI: The Effect of Uncertainty, Irreversibilities and Strategic Interactions, 
Working Paper Yale University  
14Grenadier, S.R., 1996 The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in the Real 
Estate Markets, Journal of Finance 
15Lambrecht, B.M., 2001 The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a Duopoly, The Review of 
Financial Studies 
16Huisman, K.J.M., Kort, P.M., Pawlina, G. & Thijssen, J.J., 2004 Strategic Investment under Uncertainty: 
Merging Real Options with Game Theory, ZfB- Ergänzungsheft 3/2004 
17Some examples for the few empirical analyses of firms’ geographical market entry are the following studies: L. 
Fuentelsaz, J. Gomez and Y. Polo, F, 2000, Followers’ entry timing: Evidence from the Spanish Banking 
Sector after Deregulation, Strategic Management Journal, presented an empirical analysis of the Spanish 
Banking system after deregulation and K. Gielens and M.G. Dekimpe, 2004, How to Size the Window of 
Opportunity: The Entry Strategy of Retail Firms into Transition Economies ERIM Report Series Research in 
Management analysed foreign retailers entry in Eastern Europe.  
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indebtedness, political risks) and in relative terms (e.g. economic growth, GDP per capita). 
However, each country represented new markets for those Western European companies 
which were eager to grow and were looking for new investment opportunities.  
 
After reviewing the 15-year economic development of Eastern European countries, it is 
possible to analyse the market entry behaviour of foreign investors in order to understand the 
key factors of their success or failure. By doing this one should understand the drivers, which 
determined the timing of market entry and which differentiated the entrants from non-entrants 
and the early entrants from late entrants.  
Interviews with corporate leaders of entrant companies from that period reveal the foreign 
companies’ strategies relating to their Eastern European expansions. The following citations 
give a closer insight into the core of these strategies: 
 
“We needed countries where we could be early entrants, countries that were 
stable, and countries with sufficient spending power per capita and with growth 
potential… This led us to identify the former Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe and a few overlooked emerging countries in Asia”18 
 
“Dynamic growth is part of our strategy. Potential for growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe is much bigger because growth is amplified by the region’s 
dynamic economic development and the amount of catching up that needs to be 
done in some banking markets.”19  
 
“First of all, we entered neighbouring countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Slovenia before expanding into the others. As a result we are something of a 
pioneer in those markets and we have been able to exploit our first-mover 
advantage.”20 
Browsing CEO interviews like the above citations from the last two decades show the 
following common strategy concept of successful entrant companies: 
 
· Focus on extensive growth opportunities 
· Early entry with the aim of benefiting from the first-mover’s advantage 
                                                 
18Terry Leahy, CEO of British supermarket chain Tesco, June 2006 The grocers’ global battlefield, Internet 
19Interview with Walter Rothensteiner, 2005 CEO RZB Austria; Annual report RZB Group 
20Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer, CEO OMV AG, March 2003 The Wall Street Transcript Publisher, Internet 
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· Targeting a carefully selected small number of countries  
· Support of strong core business at home which financed the expansion 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and measure the impact of factors, which influence the 
market entry decision of competing firms in order to analyse and understand firm’s 
geographical market entry behaviour.  
 
The next three chapters of this work present a theoretical framework for modelling market 
entry decisions in continuous-time under uncertainty. As in reality irreversibility of 
investment costs and management flexibility of optimising the entry timing are very important 
characteristics of the entry decision, an optimal stopping problem in continuous–time has 
been chosen as a general framework for the analysis. The impact of competition was added to 
the basic model by adapting the game theoretical approach with the aim of finding the 
equilibrium of the competing firms’ strategies.  
 
In chapter 5 the results of the theoretical models have been used in order to set up a 
hypothesis for a general empirical analysis and to test the significance of various identified 
factors assumed to influence the market entry decisions of firms. The empirical analysis was 
carried out using the data of Western European food retailers entering Eastern European 
countries after the fall of the communist regimes in the region. Grocery retailers have been 
chosen for testing the hypothesis of the theoretical results for two main reasons:  
 
1. Western European retailers were eager to grow in that time period as most of them 
experienced maturing domestic markets with a growth rate of close to zero and a high 
concentration of top competitors. 
2. The lack of major domestic players as incumbents in most of the Eastern European 
counties in the transitional period provided an excellent opportunity to research the 
entry behaviour of firms into new untapped markets. 
With saturated home markets in the background and new opportunities in Eastern Europe it 
was inevitable that Western European retailers entered the Eastern European countries from 
the beginning of the 90s. However, entry strategies of the grocery retailers differed from each 
other in many aspects.  
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On the one hand certain Eastern European countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary) were more attractive than others (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria). Foreign retailers 
showed up for example in Poland, in Hungary and in the Czech Republic from the beginning 
of the 90s while their number was already above ten by the end of the decade when retailers 
first started to consider Romania and Bulgaria as serious targets. 
On the other hand competitors’ interest towards the same country differed also significantly. 
Rewe and Tengelman for example started their operation in Hungary and in the Czech 
Republic at the beginning of the 90s while considerable players of the industry like Tesco and 
Metro entered these markets only years later.  
 
The fact that despite their growing international activities many retailers are struggling with 
competition and fail to survive in a more global industry recently motivated researchers and 
consultants to analyse the key factors for success of market entry strategies. AT Kearney for 
example stated, that right timing was essential of the success and many companies failed as 
they entered too soon or too late21. Retailers often appeared to be motivated to enter new 
markets by the fear of being left out by their competitors rather than by the chance of 
generating value in the new markets. 
                                                 
21Farra, F. and Bell, D.; 2006 Globalisation strategies: How to crack new markets, European Business Forum 
Issue 25, Internet  
  
2 Theoretical Background of Investment Decisions under 
Uncertainty 
 
 
2.1 Dynamic Net Present Value  
 
 
“although India represents the next big market for growth, most global retailers are 
restricting themselves to keeping a watching brief on the country22” 
 
 
The right timing of an investment decision is a central problem in capital budgeting. Western 
European managers and investors faced more volatile markets in Eastern Europe than at home 
when they were considering to enter the markets of the region in the early 90s. Furthermore 
their market entry decisions, like every decision relating to foreign direct investments, had 
two very important characteristics:  
 
1. The investment costs (at least partially such as rental costs, marketing costs, staff 
recruitment costs etc…) were irreversible, or sunk costs.  
2. The investment decision was not a “now or never” decision, it depended on the 
management and could be freely delayed.  
 
By watching and analysing missteps and successes in the globalisation process of large 
grocery retailers A.T Kearney23 identified the early entry as one of main strategic lessons of 
market entrance pointing out that generally there is only a five to six-year window of 
opportunity to enter an emerging market. A.T. Kearney reflected the importance of time and 
timing in the following strategic advice: “Think ahead by several years and choose the timing 
of entry carefully.”24 
 
                                                 
22Davis,G., 2006 The grocers’ global battlefield, Internet 
23Farra, F., A.T. Kearney and D. Bell, 2006 Globalisation strategies: How to crack new markets, European 
Business Forum issue 25 
24Farra, F. and Bell, D.,2006 Globalisation strategies: How to crack new markets, European Business Forum 
Issue 25, Internet 
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Timing decision of investments can not be supported by the simple static NPV (net present 
value) calculations25. These decisions need to be modelled by the application of an optimal 
stopping problem in a continuous-time model, where continuation means waiting and 
stopping equals investing.  
 
The model developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986)26 analyses the optimal timing decision 
of investment project assuming sunk investment costs and a project value which follows a 
geometrical Brownian motion. The remarkable result of these authors’ continuous–time 
model shows the existence of an excess value of waiting compared to the static NPV results. 
This value needs to be compensated in addition to the investment costs at the time when the 
investment decision is made.27 Consequently the investment trigger occurs at a higher level of 
project value than suggested by the static NPV rule. 
Based on these results the dynamic NPV of investment opportunities involve the following 
value components for the investors: 
 
Dynamic NPV = Static NPV (intrinsic value) + Opportunity costs of waiting (time value) 
 
In cases where uncertainty is high, the opportunity costs of waiting increases. This implicates 
that the ability to change the investment strategy may represent a significant value component 
since it allows for investors to maximise the time value of investments. Driven by the changes 
in the investment environment investors typically face the following decisions with 
significant time value: (i) timing of the entry/exit decisions (ii) extension/reduction of the 
invested capital. Professional investors and managers have long intuited the additional value 
of decisional flexibility. Empirical studies show that the actual investment behaviour of firms 
differs from the general NPV rule. As a result firms are more cautious both in exit and entry 
decisions and therefore absorb operating losses or require an excess return before making 
their final decision.28 
                                                 
25A more detailed critic of the static NPV method can be found in Chapter One of Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, S.R., 
1994 Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press 
26McDonald, R. and Siegel, D. 1986 The Value of Waiting to Invest, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
27A formal deduction of the time value of investment decisions is presented in Chapter 3 under the analysis of 
market entry in a monopoly economy. 
28Several empirical studies showed that firms generally invest in projects where the expected return incorporates 
extra return above the theoretically required rate. On the other hand it was also observed that firms are willing 
to stay in business and absorb operating losses. This contradicts the general exit rule based on which exit 
should happen in case the variable costs are no longer recovered. (One example for these studies is Bulan, L. 
Mayer, C. Somerville, C.T.  Irreversible Investment, Real Option and Competition: Evidence from Real Estate 
Development, Wharton School Samuel Zell & Robert Lurie Real Estate Center, University of Pennsylvania)  
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2.2 Strategic Value  
 
 
“…everybody wants to be in the top three in a country. If you are seventh, eighth or ninth, 
then you're not in the game."29 
 
 
Can investors in a competitive environment maximise the opportunity costs of waiting when 
making investment decisions? What kind of impact has the competition on foreign direct 
investments? Do some firms have competitive advantage in a “market entry game”? If yes, 
what are the factors that the competitive advantage depends on?  
These are typical questions which arise after browsing interviews with corporate leaders who 
managed successful market entry in Eastern European markets. 
 
There are situations, where competitors jointly held investment opportunities. Foreign direct 
investments generally belong to such situations. As these opportunities are non-exclusive by 
nature, the intensity of competition may force market players to invest earlier than others at a 
date which occurs before maximising the time value of waiting.  
 
To decide on the correct investment strategy in cases of non-exclusive ownership of 
investment opportunities not only the parameters of the investment project itself are to be 
considered carefully but also the number of competitors and their relative strength to each 
other. The evaluation of such situations consists therefore of an additional step: after the 
project value has been determined, it should be allocated to its owners based on a certain 
procedure. 
 
As a result of the allocation procedure the value of investment opportunities being held jointly 
by competitors can be split up to the following value components: 
 
Strategic value of investments = Dynamic NPV value ±  Strategic premium  
 
                                                 
29Roberts, B., global retail analyst, 2006 The grocers’ global battlefield, Internet 
Theoretical Background of Investment Decisions under Uncertainty 
 9 
The strategic premium results from the impact of one firm’s action on its rivals’ optimal 
response. The investment decision has therefore not only a direct influence on the firm’s own 
profit but it also has an indirect strategic effect via the competitor’s reaction. 
The strategic premium can be positive or negative. Its sign depends on whether confrontation 
or cooperation features in the firms’ behaviour toward each other.  
If firms compete in the traditional sense, one firm’s gain is generally the other’s loss (zero-
sum games). In theses situations the negative externality of the firm’s action implies 
contrarian reaction of the counterparts.  
However, there are situations where the response is complementary and both parties gain if 
their coordinate their actions. In these games one firm’s behaviour has positive externality on 
the payoff function of his counterpart and the partners intend to cooperate in order to create a 
larger total pie.  
 
If the investment creates shared benefits for the competitors then the strategic value of early 
investment is negative. However, if the competitive reactions are contrarian, then the early 
investment deters the competitors and the strategic value is positive. This also means that 
positive strategic value generally reduces the time value of waiting as the firm should act 
before his counterpart in order to get the leading role. Market entry games are generally 
competitors’ race for market shares and as such require confrontation of the players. 
 
If the competitor’s investment decisions are contingent upon each other’s action, then the 
application of game theory becomes necessary for valuing the strategy of different investors. 
One firm may preempt his competitors by entering a new market earlier than other firms. This 
is a simple case of strategic games, where competitive strategy can be analysed by a 
combination of dynamic NPV valuation method and industrial organisational game theoretic 
concept.
  
3 Standard Theoretical Market Entry Models  
 
3.1 Overview 
 
This chapter presents valuation models combining the dynamic NPV valuation with game 
theory for the measurement of the strategic value of market entrance. The standard models 
measure basically the impacts of host market demand potential and competition among 
potential entrants on the market entry equilibrium.  
 
The basic structure and assumptions of the standard duopoly model follow the analysis of 
Dixit and Pindyck30 (1996). These authors presented the valuation of market entrance in a 
duopoly case with identical firms and analysed the effects of strategic interaction of the firms 
on the time value of the market entry based on the model of Smets (1991)31. The continuous-
time equilibrium analysis in the case of endogenously given Leader and Follower roles is 
based on the paper of Huisman, Kort, and Pawlina32. These authors extended the closed loop 
equilibrium analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole33 with application of mixed strategies in 
continuous time and completed the real option analysis of investment in new technologies 
 
In this thesis the equilibrium analysis of the existing literature is extended in three various 
ways in the next chapter:  
· In the first extension it is analysed how the existence of Follower’s entry barrier 
impacts the equilibrium outcome of the standard case. In this model competitors 
remain equal, but the stake of being the first investor increases.  
· In the second extension the equilibrium outcome of unequal competitors with 
asymmetric operational profitability or with asymmetric financial strength is 
examined. The aim of this analysis is to find out how one firm’s comparative strength 
                                                 
30Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S., 1996 Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press 
31Smets, F., 1991 Exporting versus FDI: The Effect of Uncertainty, Irreversibilities and Strategic Interactions, 
Working Paper, Yale University  
32Huisman, K.J.M., Kort, P.M. and Pawlina, G., 2004 Strategic Investment under Uncertainty: Merging Real 
Options with Game Theory, ZfB-Ergänzungsheft 3/2004  
33Fudenberg, D., Tirol, J., 1985 Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology, The Review 
of Economic Studies  
distorts the standard equilibrium results and to identify the best strategy which the 
unequal firms should follow respectively. 
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· In the third extension the market entry equilibrium outcome is extended for the case of 
more that two competing firms. 
 
The case of Follower entry barrier requires a limited extension of the standard model. The 
presentation of a similar case has not been found in the existing literature.  
 
The impact of asymmetry on firm’s investment decision is rarely analysed in economic 
literature.  
Huisman (2001)34 , Pawlina and Kort (2006)35 presented how asymmetric investment costs 
influence the technology innovation of firms, which already compete on a market. The results 
of these authors present a slightly different case to the geographical market entry decision of 
firms for two reasons. First, their analysis is based on the assumption that the introduction of 
new technology can cannibalise the profit of existing products in these markets. Second, in 
case of geographical market entry, firm specific asymmetry occurs in operational or financial 
strength rather than in the investment costs36.  
Lambrecht (2001)37 presented how debt financing affects the survival probability of 
competitors and influences the order of market entry and exits. However, his analysis also 
incorporates the existence of incumbent firm(s) and represents therefore a different approach. 
 
Market entry models with more than two competing firms have been very limitedly 
researched in the existing literature. Lambrecht (2001)38 and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)39 
presented some incomplete results with more than two competing firms without exact and 
complete deduction of the equilibria. 
                                                 
34Huisman, K.J.M., 2001 Technology Investment: A Game Theoretical Real Option Approach. Kluwer 
Academic Publisher, Boston 
35Pawlina, G., and Kort, P.M., 2006 Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who benefits from your 
Competitive Disadvantage?, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 15 
36The assumption of different investment costs of firms in these authors’ model is different to the case of 
Follower entry barrier, where additional investment costs are not firm specific but relate to the Follower role. 
37Lambrecht, B.M., 2001 The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a Duopoly, The Review of 
Financial Studies 
38Lambrecht, B.M., 2001 The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a Duopoly, The Review of 
Financial Studies 
39Fudenberg, D., Tirol, J., 1985 Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology, The Review 
of Economic Studies 
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The basic structure of the theoretical models is as follows: 
 
1. In the first stage the value of market entrance for a single firm in case of a monopoly 
economy is presented. This is a benchmark case with a sole timing decision, where the 
impact of host market demand potential on the firm’s optimal entry strategy is 
analysed within a dynamic NPV valuation framework. 
 
2. In the second stage the model is extended to a duopoly economy in order to add the 
impact of competition to the analysis. Assuming rational and identical firms in the first 
step, those equilibria are examined which are supported by symmetric strategies.  
 
The symmetric duopoly model is extended in the next step and the impacts of the 
following types of asymmetry are examined with respect of the timing of market entry 
and the determination of the Leader and the Follower roles:  
 
· Follower’s entry barrier (e.g. higher investment costs of the second entrant in the 
form of additional marketing expenses) 
· asymmetric operational profitability of the competitors (e.g. different fixed costs 
of operation) 
· asymmetric capital costs of the competitors (e.g. different financial leverage) 
 
The aim of the duopoly analysis is to examine how the competition and the differences 
among competitors distort the optimal market entry date supported by the results of 
the dynamic NPV valuation in monopoly economy. 
 
3. In the third stage the duopoly model is extended to the oligopoly case, with more than 
two competing firms. 
 
The results of the theoretical models are used to understand the entry pattern and 
behaviour of Western European retailers into the Eastern European markets. The aim of 
the analysis is to set up a hypothesis on how general macroeconomic factors of the host 
markets (which are common to all firms) and how competition with firm specific factors 
influence the market entry strategies of foreign investors. 
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3.2 Market Entry in a Monopoly Economy 
 
 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
 
 
At this stage of the analysis the investment decision of a monopoly, which has the opportunity 
to enter a new market with sunk costs of 0I > is considered. It is assumed that the firm is 
value maximising, risk neutral and finances its market entry entirely with equity.  
The profit curve ( )tP  presents the firm’s profit at time t and can be calculated as the profit 
margin multiplied by the sales volume. The sales volume depends on the level of host market 
demand potential. It is represented by a downward-sloping inverse demand curve, which is 
assumed to be subject to continuous macroeconomic shocks. The profit curve of the firm can 
be written by the following function:  
 
(1) [ ]Q(t)DX  P(t) tp= , in which  
(2)  XdzXdt  dX sm += ,  
(3) xX =0 , and 0>x   
 
where dz follows a standard Wiener process, m  is the instantaneous conditional expected 
percentage change in tX  per unit time ( )0>> mr  and 0>s  is the instantaneous conditional 
standard deviation per unit time. The positive drift m  in the Wiener process reflects the 
assumption of continuous macroeconomic growth on the market.  
[ ]Q(t)D  represents a downward-sloping inverse demand curve, where Q  equals the number of 
competitors on the market. In case of assuming a monopoly economy 1Q =  holds40. 
0³p  presents the profit margin the firm can realise on one unit of output in absolute 
monetary terms41. For simplicity it is assumed that risk in tX has a correlation of one with the 
overall market risk noted as mr .  
                                                 
40 [ ]Q(t)D  is a strictly positive constant 
41For the reason of simplicity the staggered impact of fixed or quasi fixed operational costs is ignored in the 
model. 
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3.2.2 Valuation Model 
 
 
Upon market entrance the monopoly firm receives the monopoly profit, which can be written 
according to the previously defined profit curve as  
 
(4) [ ]1D X  P(t) tp=   
 
 
3.2.2.1 Market Entry Trigger  
 
 
Before the optimal market entry date, the Monopoly waits with the market entrance. As the 
investment opportunity yields no current cash flow under waiting the total return is expected 
in the form of capital gains equalling mr  per unit time. The Monopoly chooses the optimal 
entry date by maximising the value of his investment. The date of market entry occurs 
therefore if the Monopoly’s return on investments per unit time equals the expected amount of 
capital gain on the market entry per unit time. This non-arbitrage equilibrium requirement is 
formally expressed by the following Bellman equation: 
 
(5) ( )[ ]ttm XdMEdtXMr =)(  
 
Applying Itô`s lemma for expressing the capital gain by the instantaneous change in the 
present value of the Monopoly’s investment and calculating the expectation’s operator the 
following homogeneous linear equation of second order is obtained: 
 
(6) )(- )(+= 2 tmttt XMrXMMX `X  )``(X 2
1 0 t
2 ms  
 
It is assumed that mr<m . This implies the existence of trigger value at MtX , where the 
Monopoly gives up the strategy of waiting and enters the market. This trigger occurs when t 
exceeds Mt . Therefore the following two boundary conditions are imposed in order to define 
the optimal market entry date: 
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The “value matching” condition reflects that upon market entrance the value of waiting (time 
value of the investment) equals zero. This means, that the entry’s payoff equals the present 
value of the perpetual monopoly profit minus the sunk investment costs as expressed below: 
 
(7) I- =
Mt
X 
)-(r
D(1)  )M(X
m
t M m
p  
 
The “smooth pasting” condition ensures that the first derivatives or slopes of the functions 
expressing waiting and investing match at 
Mt
X  so that tM is the sole trigger date, which 
maximises the value of the Monopoly’s market entry42. This condition is expressed in the 
following equation.  
 
(8) 
)-(r
D(1)  )M`(X
m
tM m
p
=  
 
As an additional boundary condition the equation 0M(0) =  can be posed. This condition 
ensures that zero is the absorbing barrier of the monopolistic profit and if tX  ever reaches 
zero it will remain there forever. 
Solving the equilibrium differential equation (6) subject to the above boundary conditions 
gives the following optimal entry threshold for the Monopoly firm: 
 
(9) I
D(1)
)-(r 
1
 X mt M p
m
b
b
-
=  
 
where  
(10) 1
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
22
>
+úû
ù
êë
é -+-
=
s
smsms
b
mr
 holds. 
 
                                                 
42 In case these slopes were different, another optimal entry date would exist either to the right or to the left of 
Mt
X . A more detailed description of the smooth pasting condition can be found in Chapter 4 of Dixit, A.K., 
Pindyck, R.S., 1996 Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press. 
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3.2.2.2 Value Function 
 
 
Based on the results of the optimal market entry threshold, the value function of the 
Monopoly’s market entry can be expressed depending on actual level of host market maturity. 
 
If [ )¥Î ;XX
Mtt
, then the Monopoly will invest immediately and get the static NPV value of 
the market entry expressed by the value matching condition in equation (7):  
 
(11) I-   
- tm
X
r
D  
)(
)1(
m
p . 
 
If [ )
Mtt
X0; X Î , then the Monopoly will wait with the investment until the optimal entry 
trigger  X
Mt
, where he receives the net present value of I-   
- Mtm
X
r
D  
)(
)1(
m
p  for the market 
entrance. The expected value of the Monopoly entry before the optimal entry threshold can be 
therefore expressed by discounting the net present value of market entrance at Mt to the actual 
date t  as expressed below: 
 
(12) ( )[ ] ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
I-  
-
--
m
p
m
tttr
r
DX
eE MMm
)1( ,  
 
where  tM  denotes the random first time the process reaches the optimal level of  X Mt starting 
from  X t  and 
( )[ ]ttr MmeE --  represents the discount factor for a stochastic period of ( )t- t M .  
 
Replacing the value of the discount factor43 into equation (12) the value function of the 
Monopoly’s market entrance takes the following form: 
 
(13) ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
I-  
-÷
÷
ø
ö
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è
æ
m
p
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m
t
t
t
r
DX
X
X M
M
)1(  
                                                 
43 Detailed deduction is presented by Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S., 1996 Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton 
University Press page 315-316 
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Combining the results of equation (11) and equation (13) the value function of the Monopoly 
market entry can be written as follows: 
 
(14) 
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3.2.3 Conclusion: 
 
 
In this section the geographical market entry of one firm in isolation without the impact of 
competition has been examined. Resolving an optimal stopping problem in continuous time 
the following entry strategy of the Monopoly has been obtained:  
 
 
3.2.3.1 Market Entry Strategies 
 
 
If the demand potential on the host market is below the critical level of 
Mt
X  the dynamic NPV 
value of the Monopoly’s market entry has significant time-value and the Monopoly waits with 
the investment. 
 
If the demand potential on the host market has reached the critical level of 
Mt
X  the time-value 
of further waiting evaporates and an immediate investment occurs. The value of market 
entrance equals the static NPV of the future perpetual monopoly profit cash flows minus the 
up front investment costs.  
 
Rewriting the formula of the optimal investment trigger of the firm in equation (9) and 
substituting 
1-
=
b
b
V  the following modified investment rule is obtained:44 
 
(15) IX 
)(
)1(
Mt
V
m
p
=
-mr
D  
 
Since 1>V  holds45, the dynamic NPV valuation analysis requires a higher investment trigger 
than that of the traditional static NPV formula. This mark-up is due to the lost flexibility of 
further waiting, which is given up with the investment and the value of which should 
therefore be compensated by the future cash flows.  
                                                 
44Similar analysis can be found in Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S., 1996 Investment under Uncertainty 
45Equation 1>V  holds based on equation (10). 
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The following chart presents the value function of the Monopoly market entrance defined by 
equation (14):  
 
Chart 1: Market Entry in Monopoly Economy 
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In the absence of competition the value of the market entry comprises of the traditional static 
NPV (intrinsic value) of the investment project and of the waiting premium (time value). The 
waiting premium expresses the value of the decisional flexibility, which value component the 
Monopoly can maximise. 
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3.2.3.2 Impact of Common Economic Indicators of the Host Market  
 
 
“We needed countries …. that were stable, and countries with sufficient spending power per 
capita and with growth potential… This led us to identify the former Communist countries of 
Eastern Europe and a few overlooked emerging countries in Asia”46 
 
The results of the Monopoly market entry model reveal that common economic factors of the 
host market influence the timing of investors’ arrival.  
Increase in host market volatility (expressed by s ) deters foreign investors’ arrival since the 
value of waiting goes to indefinite with uncertainty. Hence, attractive growth opportunities of 
the target markets (noted by m ) have the reverse impact on the time value of investment and 
accelerate the market entry of foreign companies47. 
 
The time value of geographical market entry is significantly driven by common economic 
indicators of the host market. The results indicate that those Eastern European countries 
which provided more economic stability and higher growth in demand potential have become 
earlier attractive targets for foreign investments.  
Eastern European countries showed strong differences in macroeconomic performance 
indicators such as real GDP growth, annual inflation, foreign debt level and development of 
legal system. Unfortunately such statistical figures are not completely available in the 
Eurostat48 database as many Eastern European countries did not report for the period between 
1989 and 1994. In order to limit the potential distortion impact of these variables to the test 
results, only those countries were selected which were candidates of the European Union 
expansion in the period of analysis. This method ensured that a relative homogenous group of 
Eastern European countries in terms of these common economic indicators was created.  
                                                 
46Leahy, T., CEO of British supermarket chain Tesco, 2006 June The grocers’ global battlefield, Internet 
47Expressions of the optimal market entry date in equations (9) and (10) show the following limit values of V  
to the common economic factors of the host market: ¥=
¥®
V
s
lim  and 0lim =
®
V
m mr
. The third 
variable in β represents the discount rate of future cash flows. For simplicity reasons the model assumes that 
discount rate has a correlation of one with the host market demand potential ( )tX . 
48Eurostat (epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) is the central statistical office of the EU  
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3.2.3.3 Impact of Economies of Scale of Investment Costs  
 
 
"What's important is not to lose any local economies of scale. That's why it's important to be 
number one in a country and not just build (aggregate) sales across countries."49 
 
 
The result of equation (9) shows, that assuming constant investment costs per unit of output 
( )úû
ù
ê
ë
é
QD
I , the timing of the market entry does not depend on the absolute size of the 
Monopoly’s market and 
Mt
X remains unchanged. This means, that independently from the 
absolute market size, investors enter new markets at the same level of demand potential per 
capita.  
 
However, if the investment costs per unit of output are different, then markets with larger 
absolute demand potential representing higher economies of scale of investment costs become 
more attractive. In that case, depending on the absolute market size, investors’ market entry in 
countries with higher absolute level of demand potential occurs earlier than entry in countries 
with lower absolute level of demand potential.  
 
Chart 2: Impacts of Different Economies of Scale of Investment Costs 
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49Leahy, T., CEO of British supermarket chain Tesco, 2006 June The grocers’ global battlefield, Internet 
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As the lower investment costs per unit of output increase the intrinsic value of the market 
entry, the investors’ preference for markets with higher demand potential is in line with the 
results of both the static and the dynamic NPV analysis.  
However, one should observe that the dynamic NPV analysis requires a higher compensation 
( )1>V  and consequently further delay of entry in countries with lower level of absolute 
demand potential. This results from the fact that not only the intrinsic value but also the time 
value component of the dynamic NPV correlates positively with the level of investment costs 
per unit of output.  
 
Decreasing economies of scale of investment costs driven by fixed costs of foreign market 
entry such as those relating to cost of administration, logistics, marketing, personnel etc… 
implicate that investments in Eastern European countries with higher absolute level of 
demand potential occurred earlier. 
The impact of absolute level of demand potential on the timing of market entry of foreign 
investors can be measured by separating the explanatory variables average GDP (or 
purchasing power) per capita and average number of inhabitants in the empirical tests50.  
Due to the rapid economic development of the region average GDP per capita generally 
increased but varied significantly both across years in a given country and across countries in 
Eastern Europe. As the time value of investment evaporates with increase in host market 
demand potential, the level of GDP per capita can provide an explanation why first 
investment of foreign retailers occurred in Hungary and in the Czech Republic, which showed 
significantly high GDP per capita compared to other countries at the beginning of the 90s.  
During the analysed period average number of inhabitants of the Eastern European countries 
did not change dramatically but showed significant differences across countries. The 
relatively large population of Poland and Romania can explain that foreign retailers entered 
these countries at a relative low level of average GDP per capita compared to Hungary and to 
the Czech Republic. 
                                                 
50The multiple of these two explanatory variables is assumed to reflect the absolute level of host market demand 
potential. 
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3.3 Market Entry in a Duopoly Economy 
 
3.3.1 Assumptions 
 
 
In duopoly analysis identical firms with exogenously assigned Leader and Follower roles are 
considered in the first step.  
Since the number of firms is two the market demand function is described by D[Q(t)] where 
Q Є {0;1;2}. The firm which moves first into the new market is the Leader, while the other 
firm, which moves later, is called as Follower. Both firms are assumed to have complete 
information with respect to all model parameters (including their rival’s).The discounted 
profit stream of the Leader, investing at time t, is given by L(Xt), while the same for the 
Follower is denoted by F(Xt). It is assumed that ( ) ( ) ttt XforXFXL "³  which means, 
that the market entry of the Leader has no positive externalities on the Follower’s market 
entry. If both firms enter the market at the same time t  then a joint investment occurs and the 
discounted profit stream for both firms equals J(Xt).  
Following the standard calculation procedures of dynamic games first the value of the 
Follower is determined by working backward in building up the model. In case of 
exogenously given roles investors’ strategies are the sole function of host market demand 
potential and investors can not react to each others’ action. Assuming that the Leader has 
already entered the new market, the Follower faces a sole timing decision to maximise the 
value of duopoly profit stream. After having determined the Follower’s entry date, the 
analysis can concentrate on the value of the Leader, who should optimise his market entry 
conditional on the Follower’s strategy. The aim of this analysis is to find the optimal 
investment rule of the firms depending on the level of demand potential on the host market 
with the value-maximising investment threshold level of the Leader noted by 
Lt
X and of the 
Follower noted by 
Ft
X . This is a benchmark strategy which is used to analyse the impact of 
possible strategic interaction of the firms. 
In the next stage of the analysis the Leader and the Follower roles are determined 
endogenously with the application of game theoretical analysis. In this section the perfect 
equilibrium is defined by closed-loop entry strategies of the firms, which allow investors to 
react both to the host market development and to each other’s action. 
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3.3.2 Valuation Model  
 
 
In case of the exogenously given Leader and Follower roles neither firm takes into account 
that they could influence the other’s entry date. In this situation the Follower enters the 
market only after the Leader by definition and both firms precommit themselves to the entry 
date, which maximises the value of their investments. Based on this procedure the optimal 
strategy of the firms will define the open loop equilibrium of the market entry game of 
symmetric duopoly firms.  
 
 
3.3.2.1 Value Function of the Follower 
 
 
As the Follower maximises the value of his market entry after the Leader’s entrance, he faces 
almost the same entry decision as the Monopolist. The significant difference between the 
Monopolist’s and the Duopolist Follower’s entry choice is that the duopoly profit per unit 
time of ( )2DtXp  is below the Monopolist’s profit per unit time of ( )1DtXp , due to the 
downward-sloping inverse demand curve51. Based on the above argument the Follower’s 
value function and optimal entry date can be expressed by replacing the monopoly profit with 
the duopoly profit in equations (9) and (14) as presented below:  
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where )()( tt XMXF <  and MF tt XX >  since )1()2( DD <  
                                                 
51Both investors invest the same amount of investment costs noted by I . 
Standard Theoretical Market Entry Models 
 25 
3.3.2.2 Immediate Joint Market Entry  
 
 
Since firms are assumed to be symmetrical, in case of immediate joint market entrance both 
firms pay the same investment costs and receive the same duopoly profit per unit time.  
The payoff values of the firms’ immediate joint investment equals therefore the static NPV of 
the Follower’s market entry, which can be expressed based on equation (16) as follows: 
 
(18) I-   
-
= tXr
D  
)(
)2( )J(X t m
p  for [ )¥Î" ;0XX t   
 
It needs to be observed that the Follower’s value function includes the time value of potential 
waiting as premium compared to the value of immediate joint entry. Therefore applying the 
results of equations (16) and (18) the following relations hold: 
 
(19) 
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3.3.2.3 Market Entry Strategies of the Follower 
 
 
Before the optimal investment trigger 
Ft
X  the market entry opportunity incorporates 
significant time value of delay, therefore the strategy of the Follower is to wait with his entry. 
The host market demand potential is not sufficiently large for providing the expected return 
on investment costs for two firms and the Follower invests after the Leader by definition. 
 
The Follower enters the market immediately as soon as the demand potential of the host 
market reached the optimal investment threshold of 
Ft
X , where two investors can generate 
enough profit for covering their investment and waiting costs. At that point in time the time 
value of waiting with the market entrance evaporates and the value of the Follower’s 
investment equals the static NPV of the perpetual duopoly profits and investment costs. 
Given the same investment costs, the Follower’s investment trigger occurs later than that of 
the Monopoly since the Follower’s future market share (future profit) is smaller. 
 
The following chart presents the value functions and the optimal market entry thresholds of 
the Monopolist and the Follower Duopolist: 
 
Chart 3: Follower Market Entry in Duopoly Economy 
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3.3.2.4 Value Function of the Leader 
 
 
Once the Leader entered the market at Lt  he receives the monopoly profit of [ ]1DX  P(t) tp= , 
until the Follower’s optimal entry date at Ft . Following the Follower’s arrival both firms 
receive the same perpetual duopoly profit of D[2]X  P(t) tp= . Depending on the initial level of 
host market demand potential the Leader’s value function can be derived based on the present 
value of the following expected future cash flows: 
 
If [ )¥Î ;XX
Ftt
, then the Leader invests immediately as the demand potential of the host 
market is large enough to provide the expected return on investment for the Duopolist 
competitors. In that case the Leader invests immediately with the Follower and both firms get 
the static NPV value of the perpetual duopoly profit and investment costs as expressed below: 
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If [ )
FL ttt
X;X X Î , then the demand potential of the host market provides the expected return 
on investment for only one firm. Therefore the Leader invests immediately and gets the 
monopoly profit until a stochastic expiration date of Ft , where the Follower enters the market. 
The expected present value of Leader’s profit flow can be formally expressed as follows: 
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For technical convenience52 the above profit flow can be stripped further as the perpetual 
dividend rate of the Monopoly profit starting from the date of the Leader’s market entrance 
minus the perpetual mark-up rate between the monopoly profit and the duopoly profit which 
the Leader looses from the date of the Follower’s market entrance53.  
                                                 
52 The deduction of the Leader value function presented in this section differs slightly from those provided in the 
existing literature. The method applied was chosen to provide a more detailed economic interpretation rather 
than a simple mathematical procedure. 
53 This substitution can be formally expressed as ( ) ( )[ ]21)1()2( DXDXDXDX tttt pppp --=  
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Based on that idea and after replacing the results of the discount factor to the stochastic arrival 
date of the Follower from equation (13) the expression of equation (21) can be rewritten as 
follows: 
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To compare the above results with the value function of the Follower, the last expression in 
equation (22) should be rearranged as follows: 
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If [ )
Ltt
X0; X Î , then the demand potential on the host market is not sufficient for providing 
the expected return on the investment of the Leader. In that case the immediate market entry 
is not optimal for the Leader as it incorporates significant time value of waiting. Therefore the 
value of the Leader’s market entry can be expressed as the discounted value of the Leader 
entry at the stochastic optimal entry trigger date of Lt .  
 
This is formally expressed as follows:  
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3.3.2.5 Exogenous Market Entry Trigger of the Leader 
 
 
Equation (23) shows, that the Leader enters the market before the Follower only if the present 
value of the monopoly profits received additionally until the date of the Follower’s arrival 
compensates the lost time value of the up front investment costs54.  
 
Following this decision rule the optimal entry date of the Leader can be obtained by 
maximising the excess value of the Leader compared to the Follower value with respect to 
Lt
X . The excess value of the Leader based on equation (23) is denoted as follows:  
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Since before his market entrance the Leader realises his additional profit in the form of capital 
gain, the value function of the excess profit must satisfy the following non arbitrage 
requirement (Bellman equation): 
 
(26) ( ) ( )( )tFLtFLm XdEXr // F=F  
 
The solution of the above presented optimal stopping problem must take the following 
general form: 
 
(27) ( ) 11/ bttFL XAX =F ,  
 
In addition ( )tFL X/F  must satisfy the following boundary conditions, which holds at the 
optimal entry date of the Leader noted by 
Lt
X : 
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, which is 
obtained based on equation (23). The first component reflects the present value of the restricted monopoly 
profits and the second component shows the lost time value of earlier investment costs. 
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The “value matching” condition requires that at the optimal entry date of the Leader the 
additionally received monopoly profit per unit time compensates the loss on time value of 
early investment costs per unit time. This can be formally expressed as follows:  
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The “smooth pasting” condition requires furthermore that at optimal entry date of 
Lt
X  these 
two value components change their value to the same extent with the instantaneous change in 
tX . This requirement excludes the existence of additional optimal investment date(s) either to 
the right or to the left of the optimum and can be formally expressed as presented below: 
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while zero as absorbing barrier remains and ( ) 00/ =F FL  holds. 
 
After multiplying equation (29) by 
b
Lt
X
 and deducting it from equation (28), the optimal 
investment trigger for the Leader is obtained as follows: 
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Based on the results of equations (20), (22), (24 ) and (30) the value function of the Leader in 
case of exogenously given roles can be written as below: 
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3.3.2.6 Exogenous Market Entry Strategies of the Leader 
 
 
The result of equation (30) shows, that despite the lower profit flow of the Duopolist Leader 
the optimal investment thresholds of both the Duopolist Leader and the Monopolist occur at 
the same level of demand potential of the host market. 
 
The reason for the irrelevance of future competitor’s arrival in the optimal timing of Leader’s 
market entrance in case of exogenously given firm roles can be explained backwards as 
follows: 55 
The Duopolist firms invest immediately if the initial level of host market maturity reaches at 
least the level of optimal entry for the duopoly profit, which occurs at 
LFJ ttt
XXX >= . As 
the duopoly profit is below that of the monopoly profit by definition, the Monopoly will also 
immediately enter the host market at that level of initial demand potential56. 
In case of entry before 
Ft
X  the additionally received monopoly profit should compensate the 
loss of time value of the up-front investment costs per each unit time. These costs and benefits 
per unit time are exactly the same for both the Monopolist and the Leader Duopolist. 
Consequently compared to the joint entry date of the Duopolist firms, the market entry of both 
the Duopolist Leader and the Monopolist occurs with exactly the same units of time earlier. 
 
In case of exogenously given roles the Leader can maximise his entry value by ignoring the 
action of the Follower57 as a result of which his optimal entry date is determined by common 
economic indicators of the host market in the same way as the Monopoly’s market entry 
trigger. 
 
                                                 
55The decision problem of the optimal Leader’s market entry can be also formulated as follows: With how many 
units of time does the investment/market entrance of the Duopolist Leader and the Monopolist occur earlier 
than that of the Duopolist Follower? 
56Investment costs are assumed to be the same for both the Monopolist and for the Duopolist investors. 
57The Follower invests only after the Leader (or jointly at the same joint investment threshold) by definition. 
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The chart below presents the value functions of the Leader and the Follower in case of 
exogenously given Leader and Follower roles: 
 
Chart 4: Exogenous Leader Entry in Duopoly Economy 
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Based on the above analysis the open loop equilibrium of market entry in a duopoly economy 
with exogenously given Leader and Follower roles is given by the investment of the Leader at 
the optimal Monopoly market entry trigger noted by
ML tt
XX =  and the investment of the 
Follower at the optimal immediate joint entry trigger of the firms noted by 
LFJ ttt
XXX >= .  
As the Leader’s entry date does not influence the Follower’s profit flow the entry timing of 
the Follower and that of the Joint investment coincide at 
JF tt
XX = . This result presents a 
correction of the optimal entry thresholds given by Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 on page 31458. 
These authors’ result of 
JF tt
XX <  (or 32 YY <  based on their notation) can only hold if the 
Leader’s action has an impact on the Follower’s payoff. This situation occurs for example in 
case of assuming the existence of Follower’s entry barrier (e.g. additional marketing costs in 
case of late arrival). The market entry equilibrium in this special case will be examined in the 
next chapter under the extension of the standard valuation model. 59 
                                                 
58Dixit, A.K., and Pindyck, R.S. ,1994 Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton University Press) 
59Another example, where the results of Dixit and Pindyck hold, has been presented by K. J. M. Huisman in the 
analysis of technology investments. Huisman examined the situation where both firms are already competing 
on the market and assumed that the introduction of a new technology by one of the competitors decreases the 
profit flow of his counterpart. As in this case the Follower is interested in recapturing his market share, 
Husiman received the same equilibrium results as Dixit and Pindyck.  
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3.3.2.7 Endogenous Market Entry Trigger of the Leader  
 
 
As it is not realistic to assume that competing firms commit themselves to the Leader or to the 
Follower roles before entering a new market, in the next step of the analysis the Leader and 
the Follower roles are given endogenously.  
 
Searching for the optimal entry date of the Leader (
Lt
X ), it was assumed, that the Leader 
brings its entry date forward in time as long as the compensation of increase in the present 
value of the additionally received monopoly profit per unit time is greater than or at least 
equals the increase of the present value of the investment costs per unit time. 
Based on that assumption the sum of additionally received net present values per unit time 
which the Leader receives if [ )
FL ttt
XXX ;Î  should be positive by definition. This also means, 
that the Leader’s value exceeds the Follower’s value at the optimal Leader investment trigger 
of 
Lt
X , which can be proved formally by the following calculations: 
Denote the difference in the Duopolist firms’ investment payoffs at 
Lt
X  by the following 
expression:  
 
(32) ( ) )()(/ LLL tttFL XFXLX -=F  
 
Replacing the results of the equations (31) and (16) into equation (32) the following result is 
obtained:  
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The assumption of endogenously given Leader and Follower roles implicates, that the firm’s 
investment decision is determined by profit maximising economic considerations. As the 
                                                 
60Expression under equation (33) exceeds zero because the followings results hold: 
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Leader’s value function exceeds the Follower’s value function at 
Lt
X , there is no reason to 
believe that either firm will give up the Leader role for the Follower position. Consequently in 
order to opt for the Leader role, one firm will have the incentive to “ε-pre-empt” his 
counterpart at the optimal Leader entry date and invest at time e-=
LL tt
XX
2
 where 0>e .  
 
The best reaction of the competitor firm to that strategy would be to invest at e2
3
-=
LL tt
XX . 
Hence the preemption game continues as long as the Leader’s extra profit is eliminated and 
the process stops if ( ) 0/ =F PtFL X  holds. This requirement implies the following results at the 
optimal endogenous entry date of the Leader Duopolist:  
 
(34) )()(
PP tt
XFXL =  and 
LP tt
XX < 61  
 
As at 
Pt
X  the values of the Leader and the Follower market entries are equal, the result of the 
preemption game is called as rent equalisation. This result presents the strategic impact of 
competition which drives each firm to pre-empt his rival up until the point where the Leader’s 
market entry has no extra profit and the Leader investment strategy provides the same profit 
as the Follower’s payoffs. 
                                                 
61The preemption point 
Pt
X  represents the point in time, where the net present value of the monopoly profits 
cumulated from 
Lt
X  up until 
Ft
X  is eliminated completely. Because of the value matching condition of 
equation (28) the Leader’s additional monopoly profit does not compensate the lost time value of investment 
costs per unit time before 
Lt
X  as a result of which the Leader loses from its value in the preemption game 
with each unit of time of earlier investment than 
Lt
X . 
Standard Theoretical Market Entry Models 
 36 
Based on the above the Leader value function in the case of endogenously given roles needs 
to be modified as follows: 
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where 
Pt
X  is given by the solution of the following equation: 
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and the below presented results hold: 
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3.3.2.8 Endogenous Market Entry Strategies of the Leader 
 
 
The following chart presents the market entry value function of the Leader, the Follower and 
the Joint (immediate) investment in case of endogenously given roles and symmetric firms:  
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Because of the optimisation criteria of the Follower’s value function, the values of an 
immediate joint investment are either below the Follower’s strategy payouts (for 
[ )
Ftt
XX ;0Î"  ) or equal the Follower’s strategy payouts (for [ )¥Î" ;
Ftt
XX ).62  
 
If [ )
FL ttt
XXX Î   then the excess Monopoly profit compensates the loss in time value of up 
front investment costs per each unit time and makes it possible for one of the competitors to 
enter the market earlier than the joint investment threshold. The Leader value exceeds the 
Follower value at the Leader’s optimal investment threshold of 
Lt
X  as a result of which both 
firms want to get the Leader role and try to ε pre-empt each other. This competition for 
obtaining the Leader role accelerates the Leader’s entry beyond the optimal trigger of 
Lt
X .  
                                                 
62The Follower value function includes the time value of the joint investment, which additional value evaporates 
at the optimal joint entry date by definition. 
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Since the Monopoly profit does not compensate the loss in time value of the up-front 
investment costs per unit time before the optimal Leader investment trigger, the Leader loses 
from its value by each unit time in case of an entry before 
Lt
X . Finally the preemption 
process stops at the intersection point of the Leader and the Follower value functions noted by 
Pt
X , at which point the value of the Leader’s excess profit generated by the mark-up dividend 
rate of ( ) ( )21 DD -  per unit time has been completely eliminated. At this trigger the two roles 
provide the same value of market entrance as a result of which the impact of the competition 
is referred to as rent equalisation in the literature. 
 
Before 
Pt
X  the dynamic NPV value of the market entry has positive time value even for the 
Leader. Before that date the immediate investment is therefore not optimal and both investors 
wait until the host market demand potential reaches
Pt
X . 
 
The results of the theoretical market entry model in a duopoly economy explain the staggered 
pattern of foreign retailers’ market entry behaviour in Eastern Europe, which was 
characterised by certain time lag(s) in foreign investors’ arrival within a given country. This 
entry behaviour is the result of two opposing impacts of competition on foreign investors’ 
entry: 
On the one hand expected level of competition accelerated the market entry of investors driven 
by the preemption process. This strategic impact of competition motivated first retailer(s) to 
invest soon in Eastern Europe. 
On the other hand, however, increase in actual level of competition deterred further 
investments until the host market demand potential reached a higher level. This effect implies 
that once foreign retailer(s) entered the Eastern European markets successfully their 
competitors had to wait until the demand potential increased significantly.  
 
Based on the above it is vital to separate the two opposing impacts of competition and 
measure the impact of its expected and its actual level separately in the empirical tests. 
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3.3.3 Equilibrium Strategies 
 
 
The previous section described how the first mover advantage of the Leader intensifies the 
competition between the firms and eliminates the time value of waiting by the threat of 
preemptive market entrance.  
 
Since it is only optimal for one firm to enter the market before the optimal joint entry date, the 
preemption game leads to the coordination problem between the firms on deciding which one 
of them will invest first. This section presents the solution of this coordination problem with 
the application of game theory. 
 
As both firms are assumed to be identical in the standard model, there is no reason to assume 
that firms behave differently in case of endogenously given roles. This symmetry of the firms 
implicates that the equilibrium must be determined by symmetric strategies and symmetric 
mixed strategies must be applied for the solution of the firms’ coordination problem at 
Pt
X 63.  
 
                                                 
63The market entry game of Duopolist firms is played at [ )FPt XXX ;Î  if neither of the competitors has 
invested up until tX . If ( )FPt XXX ;Î  this situation occurs either by mistake or in case the game starts at 
Pt XX > . Outside the interval of [ )FPt XXX ;Î  the firms’ strategies are obvious: below PX  both firms 
wait with the investment and above FX  both firms invest simultaneously. 
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3.3.3.1 Timing Games in District-Time 
 
 
In the first step the preemption equilibrium is analysed in district time for [ )FPt XXX ;Î . 
Applying mixed strategies and assuming that firm i invests with probability αi and firm j 
invests with probability αj, the value of firm i at tX  can be expressed based on his payoff 
matrix as follows:  
 
(38) [ ]ijitjitjitji VXJXFXLi ) - )(1 - (1 + ) + )() - (1 + )() - (1 = aaaaaaaaa (maxVi  
 
Due to the symmetry of the firms, firm j has exactly the same value at this point as expressed 
below:  
 
(39) [ ]jijtijtijtij VXJXFXLj ) - )(1 - (1 + ) + )() - (1 + )() - (1 = aaaaaaaaa (maxVj  
 
Applying the first order conditions for both firms’ value function and assuming symmetric 
strategies (which means that αj= αi=α,) the probability of the market entrance in discrete time 
is obtained as follows:  
 
(40) 
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=a  ,where [ ]1;0Îa  holds. 
 
This result reveals that each firm’s incentive for investment (the probability of market entry) 
is determined by the ratio of benefits resulting from preemption to the range of total possible 
outcome of the game. 
 
Replacing αj= αi=α into equations (38) and (39), the values of firms i and j are expressed 
respectively as follows: 
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Equation (41) expresses the value of market entry by the sum of all potential strategies 
weighted by the respective probabilities for the occurrence.  
Since the firms are identical, being the Leader occurs with the same probability of 
a
a
-
-
2
1  as 
being the Follower, while the remaining probability of 
a
a
-2
 is distributed to the occurrence 
of suboptimal Joint Investment.  
 
The result presented in equation (40) shows that rent equalisation eliminates the probability of 
suboptimal joint investment at the preemption point since α goes to zero if )tt XFXL (=)( . At 
this single point of host market demand potential investors even with endogenously defined 
roles may coordinate their strategy and agree on which company enters the new market first. 
Hence, there will be no incentive to deviate from the agreed strategy on either part, since both 
the Leader and the Follower roles provide the same payoffs at this point.64 
 
If ( )
FP ttt
XXX ;Î  then the probability of simultaneous investment is always positive and is 
increasing with the firms’ incentive to invest and to become the Leader (noted by a ). This 
result shows that risk neutral players are willing to risk as much as the expected value of their 
investment equals the expected value of the Follower’s strategy payoff in order to get the 
lucrative Leader role.  
 
For cases of [ )Pt XX ;0Î  and [ )¥Î ;Ft XX  the firms do not adopt mixed strategies as the 
optimisation problem is straightforward to solve. In the first case investment is never optimal, 
therefore 0=a , while in the second case both firms invests for sure and 1=a  holds. 
 
                                                 
64As such coordination agreements are generally illegal the most possible outcome may be that both firms wait 
with their investment one unit of time until the host market reaches a higher market maturity.  
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Investors may apply mixed strategies individually by randomly deciding on every market 
entry. In each case, investors’ decisions should follow a truly random pattern and the 
probability of investing or remaining outside should remain independent in every new 
investment opportunity from any history of decisions.65.  
 
Although it may be assumed that managers make investment decisions by intuitively 
considering the benefit of surprise in their strategies, it is hardly realistic to believe that 
corporate leaders play the market entry games based on strict probability calculations. 
However, it needs to be observed that the application of mixed strategies requires random 
appearance of decision outcomes over the group of investors and as a consequence it allows 
for individual investors to choose pure strategies. Although investors may be indifferent 
between the pure strategies of investing or waiting, it is easy to assume that individual factors 
determine which actions are chosen by which firm. The application of mixed strategies can 
therefore be regarded as the realised outcome of investment decisions of various firms, which 
results can be statistically observed and analysed ex-post based on the trend of continuously 
increasing number of foreign retailers’ entry in the Eastern European countries during the 
analysed period.  
 
                                                 
65Foreign retailers can theoretically apply individual random decisions of geographical market entry by adapting 
the following procedures:  
Market entry into a particular country needs to be considered without respect to prior market entry into other 
country/countries of the region and without respect to the outcome of previous market entry/entries. If more 
than one country reaches the necessary demand potential for the market entrance at the same time, retailers 
need to select from these countries based on the investment probability of the mixed strategy (e.g. investing in 
one randomly selected country out of three). However, investors must understand that applying mixed 
strategies gives the best possible expected value of the investments on average and incorporates outcomes of 
occasional low payoffs.  
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3.3.3.2 Timing Games in Continuous-Time 
 
 
One player’s mixed strategy in continuous-time is generally represented by a non-decreasing, 
right-continuous cumulative distribution function noted as ( ) [ ]1;0ÎtGi , which expresses the 
probability that firm i has invested by time t66. Applying this representation for equation (41) 
the expected value of firm i can be expressed as follows: 
 
(42) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) )(+-)(+-)(= åò
¥¥
tjijitijt XJtatatdGtGXFtdGtGXL
00
jii 11G;GV ,  
where the following notations have been applied: 
 
( )tG ji /1-  expresses the probability, that firm i/j has not invested up until time t. 
 
( )tdG ji /  represents the probability density function of firm i/j investment strategy and its 
value expresses the probability that firm i invests at time t in the infinitely small interval of 
[ ]e+tt; . 
 
( )ta ji /  measures the size of jump in the firms’ cumulative distribution function of jiG / at time 
t and is calculated as ( ) ( ) ( )--= tGtGta jijiji ///  where ( )-tG ji /  represents the left hand limit of 
( )tGi 67. Its value expresses the probability with which firm i/j invests at exactly time t.  
 
 
                                                 
66Following the representation of Thijssen, J.J.J., Huisman, K.J.M. and Kort, P.M., 2002 Symmetric Equilibrium 
Strategies in Game Theoretic Real Option Models, Discussion Paper CentER on page 8, the cumulative 
distribution function of firm i is independent from the strategy of his competitor. 
67The cumulative distribution function is right continuous by definition. 
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Fudenberg and Tirole argued (1985) 68 that in continuous time the symmetric mixed strategy 
of the firms can not be represented by a single distribution function as expressed by equation 
(42) since this representation can not capture the limit of discrete time equilibria with short 
time intervals. This can be proved by the following example: 
 
Let tD  be defined as the length of period of the game so that for some constant N  the 
equation tNt D=  holds. 
Applying the game’s payoff matrix, the probability that at least one investor has entered the 
new market by time t can be expressed as follows: 
 
(43) ( )( )( )Nii aa --- 111  
 
As tD  converges to zero in continuous time, the probability that at least one player has 
entered the market at any positive t  time (even at the start) converges to 169. As a 
consequence the game stops with probability 1 at the beginning of the time interval noted by 
[ )
FP tt
XXt ;0 Î . Applying the continuous time representation of the market entry strategies the 
cumulative distribution function of the firm, which invests at the beginning of the time 
interval, jumps to 1 at [ )
FP tt
XXt ;0 Î . However, this outcome represents a contradiction to 
the limit value of one firm’s investment probability at [ )
FP tt
XXt ;0 Î  in discrete time shown 
under equation (41)70. In discrete time investors can always adjust the probability of market 
entrance making the competitor indifferent to investment.  
 
Based on the above, the application of strategy space in continuous-time as presented under 
equation (42) can not capture the discrete time limits of equation (41) and leads to missing 
coordination between the players.  
 
                                                 
68Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., 1985 Preemption and Rent Equalization in Adoption of New Technology Review 
of Economic Studies  
69 ( )( )( ) 011lim =--
¥®
N
iiN
aa  since ( ) 11 <- ia  and ( ) 11 <- ja  
70As pointed out by Fudenberg and Tirole the continuous time representation of preemption game strategies links 
the atom of size one in continuous time to the same size in discrete time. However, in discrete time the atom at 
the beginning of the period does not represent the probability of investing with probability one at exactly 
[ )
FP tt
XXt ;0 Î  but it refers rather to an “interval of atoms” expressing the probability of investing after 
[ )
FP tt
XXt ;0 Î .  
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In order to capture the discrete time limits of the game in continuous time the strategy space 
should be enlarged by an additional function noted by ( )tia  to coordinate the firms’ 
investment decisions.  
 
As a result the market entry game in continuous time needs to be split respectively into 
 
(i) a timing game, which defines the optimal investment date and  
 
(ii) a coordination game, which defines the incentive of the players to invest (the 
probability of market entry). This game is played as soon as it is optimal for only 
one firm to invest 71. The outcome of this second game distributes the Leader 
and the Follower roles to the firms and creates the dependence of one firm value 
from the other’s strategy.  
 
The first game is played in continuous time and strategies are therefore given by a cumulative 
distribution function. The second game represents a repeated game in discrete time, in which 
the firms play fixed mixed strategies of investing or waiting until at least one firm invests. 
 
                                                 
71This situation occurs in the range of [ )
FP ttt
XXX ;Î . 
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The following game theoretic analysis is based on the perfect equilibrium concept of 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) which approach was extended by Thijssen, Huisman, Kort, 
Pawlina (2004)72 to stochastic games. 
 
 
Definition of Firm’s Extended Strategy Space: 
 
As the market entry game is separated into a continuous timing game and into a discrete 
coordination game the simple strategy for firm i/j should be represented at [ )¥Î ;0tt  by the 
following pair of real-valued functions  
 
(44) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
ji
ttt ttGtS
ii /
;;;; 000 waww =  where: 
 
1. ( )w;0/ ×t jiG  is non-decreasing and right-continuous cumulative distribution function 
with left limits and denotes the probability that firm i/j has invested by time t  
2. ( )wa ;0 ×t
i
 is right-differentiable and right-continuous function with left limits and 
coordinates the firms investment decision in the interval of [ ]dttt +;  by expressing 
the probability that firm i/j enters the market if investment by at least one firm is 
optimal73  
 
The firms should coordinate their continuous strategies in order to ensure, that the investment 
of at least one firm occurs at [ )
FP ttt
XXX ;Î  . The coordination requires the consistency 
between the cumulative distribution function and the discrete value function. This consistency 
is guaranteed by requiring that the increase in either firm’s incentive to invest needs to 
indicate a jump in the cumulative distribution function of both firms. The size of the jump 
should reflect the increased probability of market entrance of the firms either in the form of 
Leader or in the form of joint investment according to the payoff matrix of the market entry 
game. 
                                                 
72Thijssen, J.J.J., Huisman, K.J.M., Kort, P.M., 2002 Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game Theoretic Real 
Option Models, Discussion Paper CentER 
73In order to determine the firms’ roles in the limiting case where 0
/
=
ji
a  the following additional technical 
conditions are required: 0);(0 =wa tt
i
 and ( )( )0;inf 00 >³= wa utut ti , then ( )wa ;0 tti  has positive right 
derivative at w . 
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This requirement is named as yconsistenc-a  of the strategies and is formally expressed as 
follows: 
 
(45) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )stststst
st
stGstGstGstst t
ij
t
ji
t
ij
t
ji
t
jit
ji
t
ji
t
ji
t
ji
t
ji ;;;;
;
;1;;0;;
0000
0
00000
////
/
///// aaaa
a
aa
-+
-=-Þ¹- ---  
 
 
It is assumed that playing the game costs no time and if both firms choose the option of not 
entering the market, the game will be repeated. The simple strategy space is defined as all 
possible strategy combination of the firms denoted as follows: 
 
(46) ( ) ( )Õ=
ji
s
i
s tStS
/
00 ;; ww   
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Firms’ Expected Payoff in the Extended Strategy Space 
 
 
Let ( )tit  be the earliest point in time at which firm i enters the market in the subgame starting 
at 0t  expressed as: 
 
(47) 
( )
( )( )  î
í
ì
>>
³"=¥
=  
0;ttinf
0; if
0
0
otherwiset
ttt
i
i
i wa
wa
t  
 
In order to ensure that at least one of the firms has invested for sure by a certain time ( )tt  in 
the subgame starting at time 0t  the following notation is introduced: 
 
(48) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ttt ji ttt ;min= ,  
 
Based on the above definitions of the strategy space the expected payoff for firm i in the 
subgame starting at time t can be expressed as follows: 
 
(49) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
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t
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where  
 
( ) ( )ut
su
tt
®
- = lim  and expresses the left hand limit of ( )tt  and  
( ) ( ) ( )( )jjiii GGtW aat ;;, ;  is given by the following equations: 
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If ( ) ( )tt ij tt  ¹  then74 
 
(50) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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and  
 
If ( ) ( )tt ij tt  =  then75 
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The first two components of equation (49) appear in equation (42). They express the expected 
value of firm i up until at least when it is optimal for one firm to invest in the subgame. The 
expected value equals the sum of probabilities of either obtaining the Leader role, or 
becoming the Follower or realising the expected value of joint investment.  
 
The expression ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )tGtG ij tt -- -- 11  represents the probability that neither of the firms 
have invested76 by ( )tt . In that case at least one firm’s cumulative distribution function jumps 
to one in order to ensure that the game continues.  
 
                                                 
74This situation occurs in case of asymmetric firms 
75It holds if firms are symmetric or in those subgames of asymmetric firms which are starting at [ )
21
;
APAP ttt
XXX Î , where both firms have incentive to become the Leader (see later at the market entry analysis 
of asymmetric firms in Chapter 4.2) 
76This occurs if both firms have chosen the option of remaining outside by coincidence. 
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If ( ) ( ) ttt => tt ij  or ( ) ( ) ttt => tt ji  then firm i/j invests with probability ji /a at each period 
while firm j/i enters the market with probability 
( )
( )t
t
-- ij
ij
G
a
/
/
1
at the first instance and with 
probability zero thereafter. This corresponds to a situation in which firm j/i plays an isolated 
jump of size ( )tija /  at time t and firm i/j adapts continuously with ( )ta ji / 77.  
 
If ( ) ( ) ttt == tt ij , then both firms consider the market entrance in each period. In that case 
the probabilities of getting the Leader/Follower roles or realising Joint investments are 
calculated from discrete time limits with constant probabilities of investment expressed by 
( )ta ji / . The result is the same as presented by equation (41) under the discrete time. 
 
If ( ) ( ) 0== tt ij tt , then the firms’ payoff is obtained by a first-order Taylor expansion. 
 
                                                 
77In that case it is not optimal for firm j/i to invest until ( )tij /t , therefore firm j/i can not coordinate his strategy.  
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Nash Equilibrium in the Extended Strategy Space 
 
 
In equilibrium each firm looks for a strategy given by ( ) ( ) ( )( )
ji
ttt ttGtS
ii /
;;;; 000 waww = which 
maximises its value expressed as ( ) ( )( )ijijjijiji GGtV ///// ,;,; aa  by holding the strategy of his 
counterpart fixed (Nash equilibrium).  
 
In looking for the Nash equilibrium of market entry games firms should respond optimally to 
the exogenous move in host market demand potential, to the outcome of competitors’ mixed 
strategies and to all possible deviations of rivals from the equilibrium strategy. This 
requirement means the application of closed loop strategies by definition. 
 
In order to give the best reaction to all of the above described random outcomes at the end of 
each period, the firm’s closed loop strategy should reflect that in stochastic case the 
probability of having invested up until time v depends only on the level of demand potential at 
time v  and remains independent of that fact whether the market entry game started at time 
time t  or at time u . (The probability of investment at time t is independent of the length of 
subgame). This requirement is formally expressed below: 
 
(52) ( ) ( )vGvG uitivut =" £££0 78 
 
(53) ( ) ( ) ( )vvv iuitivut aaa ==" ££££0  
 
A tuple of firms’ closed loop strategies defines a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents 
a Nash equilibrium in every possible subgame starting at [ )¥Î ;0t . As in case of market entry 
games firms can observe and respond to their opponent’s action at the end of each period, the 
application of closed loop strategies generally means subgame perfection. 
 
                                                 
78Fudenberg and Tirole requires ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )vGuGuGvG uitititivut -+=" £££ 10  in their intertemporal consistency definition, 
requiring that the probability of having invested before time v starting at time t equals the probability of having 
invested before time u starting at time t plus the probability of having invested before time v starting at time u 
conditionally of not having invested before time u. Thijssen, .J:J.J., Hismann, K.J.M. and Kort, P.M. pointed 
out that this is not a sensible requirement in the stochastic case. 
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3.3.3.3 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Time 
 
 
The value of the distribution function ( )sG i ;×  in case of geographical market entrance of 
symmetric firms is calculated as follows:  
 
If [ )FPt XXX ;Î  than the value of ( )sG i ;×  should reflect the probability that firm i invests. In 
that case, depending on the other firm’s action, firm i either becomes the Leader by 
probability 
a
a
-
-
2
1
 or realises joint market entrance with firm j by probability 
a
a
-2
.  
 
Replacing the result of equation (40) for the expression of a , the value of ( )sG i ;×  is obtained 
by adding the probabilities of these possible outcomes.  
 
Based on the above results a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the tuple of 
closed-loop strategies ( ) ( )( )
¥<£
-
¥<£ Î t
t
j
t
j
t
i
t
i
t
to GGs 0,,, aa where 0³t  and  
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To prove that the above strategies yield Nash equilibrium in any subgame starting at 
( )FP TTt ;Î 79 the following equation should hold: 
 
(56) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tjitjitjjitjitjtjitjji XFXFGXJXLG ///////// 11 =-++- aaa  
 
The left side of equation (56) expresses the value of one firm making an isolated jump with a 
given probability. In that case, depending on his rival moves, the firm receives either the 
Leader’s role or the payoff of the joint investment. With the remaining probability of not 
making the jump, the firm becomes the Follower if the other firm invests80. The right hand 
side of equation (56) expresses the firm value in case of not making the jump for sure. 
 
By replacing the values of jiG / and ( )tt ji /a  given by equations (54) and (55) one can show 
that equation (56) holds. This implies that in each subgame of ( )FP TTt ;Î  following the 
strategies given by equations (54) and (55) makes firms indifferent between all possible 
choices81. 
 
                                                 
79Outside this interval the Nash equilibrium prevails.  
80Based on the original assumption the game is repeated if neither firm has invested while repeating the game 
costs no time. 
81A more formal proof that the under equations (54) and (55) given tuple of closed-loop strategies 
( ) ( )( )
¥<£
-
¥<£ Î t
t
j
t
j
t
i
t
i
t
to GGs 0,,, aa  represent subgame perfect equilibrium is given in Thijssen, J.J.J., 
Huisman, K.J.M. and Kort, P.M., 2002 Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game Theoretic Real Option 
Models, CentrER discussion paper 
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3.3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
The fear of rival’s preemption will not allow the firms in duopoly economy to maximise the 
time value of market entrance created by uncertainty. 
There are two critical values of the host market demand potential which split the types of 
equilibrium and the optimal strategies of the symmetric firms in a duopoly economy. 
 
1. For [ )¥Î" ,
Ftt
XX  the absolute market demand is large enough for both competitors to 
enter the market simultaneously and therefore a Joint Entrance occurs.  
 
2. For [ )
Ptt
XX ,0Î"  the absolute market demand potential is so low that neither firm 
invests.  
In this interval the value of entering the market is the same for the Leader and for the 
Follower and incorporates significant time value so that both firms wait until the 
market development reaches the preemption point.  
 
3. For ( )
FP ttt
XXX ,Î"  being the Leader is the best strategy to follow, since the 
following relations hold: 
 
· Above 
Pt
X  and before 
Ft
X  the present value of the monopoly profit opportunity 
overcompensates the lost time value of the investment costs, and consequently the 
Leader’s strategy dominates the Follower’s strategy.  
 
· The Joint Investment is not Nash optimal since entering the market to get the 
duopoly profit includes time value before 
Ft
X . Driven by this time value both the 
Leader and the Follower strategies dominate the strategy of Joint Investment. 
 
As both firms are motivated to become the Leader, the symmetric probability of 
getting the Leader or the Follower role is below one half and the mistake of Joint 
Investment at each ( )FPt XXX ,Î  occurs with positive probability. Moreover it should 
be noted that based on the results of equations (40) and (41) the probability of 
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suboptimal joint investment increases with the mark-up in the Leader’s value as the 
incentive to get the Leader role increases for both firms. 
 
Based on the above, if ( )
FP ttt
XXX ,Î , then sequential market entry equilibrium 
occurs, where one firm becomes the Leader with the probability of maximum one half 
and the other enters the market as Follower with the same probability at 
Ft
X . With the 
remaining probability both firms invest and Joint market entrance occurs, which 
outcome does not represent the Pareto Optimum for either firm. However, the 
probability of this suboptimal outcome is positive since its value reflects the maximum 
risk which risk neutral players undertake in order to receive at least the expected value 
of the Follower role. 
 
4. ( )
FP tt
XX ,0Î  represents a unique point, at which the values of the Leader and the 
Follower roles are equal. Replacing )()( tt XFXL =  into equation (40) it is obtained 
that α equals to zero at 
Pt
X . Based on equation (41) this result implies that the 
probability of joint investment goes to zero and the probability of becoming the 
Leader or Follower increases to one half at 
Pt
X . Driven by the rent equalization, there 
is no incentive for becoming the Leader at 
Pt
X  as a result of which firms may 
distribute the Leader and Follower roles among themselves82 and neither firm has the 
incentive to deviate from the distributed strategy83.  
                                                 
82Dixit, A.K. and Pindyck, R.S. state that the probability of joint investment goes to zero in the interval between 
the preemption point and the Follower’s entry date (p.313 Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton University 
Press, 1994). As pointed out by Huisman, K.J.M. this claim is only correct at the preemption point but not in 
the whole interval (p.179 Technology Investments: A Game Theoretical Real Options Approach , Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001) 
83Although distributing the roles presents a Nash equilibrium at the preemption point, such agreements are 
generally illegal. 
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The following chart presents the development of the probability of Joint investments over the 
whole interval of host market’s demand potential: 
 
Chart 6: Probability of Joint Entry in Duopoly Economy 
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As the incentive of investment depends on the additional benefit of the Leader role, it is 
expected that the more lucrative investment opportunities the individual Eastern European 
countries provided, the more investors entered these countries simultaneously.  
Poland showed the highest foreign retailer entry rate compared to the same level of demand 
potential in the analysed period. Moreover, the jump in the rate of foreign retailers’ entry 
proved also to be the highest over the years. Retail analysts pointed out that the retail market 
in Poland was saturated early by the second half of the 90s forcing a cut-throat competition 
among retailers. Based on the obtained theoretical pattern of joint entry rate this was due to 
the fact that Poland provided the highest absolute level of host market demand potential 
driven by his relative high level of GDP per capita and by his largest population in the region 
(38 million inhabitants). This high level of host demand potential increased the probability of 
suboptimal (early) joint retailers’ entry.  
 
  
4 Extension of the Standard Theoretical Market Entry Models 
 
 
4.1 Entry barrier of the Follower in Duopoly Economy 
 
 
“…(retailers) cannot afford to wait before entering these new (developing) markets because it 
could cost them too much money at a later date. The early movers will have settled in and 
staked their claims on the prime retail estate.”84 
 
 
4.1.1 Assumptions 
 
 
The existing market entry models can be extended in various ways. One interesting extension 
is obtained by assuming that entering the market as a Follower requires higher investment 
costs (e.g. intensive marketing activity) than investing first or jointly at the same time with the 
competitor.  
That case does not assume asymmetry between the competing firms. It assumes that being the 
second investor in the new market incorporates the disadvantage of an additional entry 
barrier.  
 
The importance of established customers relationships with the first mover85 in the success of 
a business in a new market is the reason why the market entry equilibrium in that special case 
has been chosen for analysis.  
 
                                                 
84The grocers’ global battlefield, 2006 Internet 
85In the case of the retail industry, advantage of established customer relationships may result from the 
acquisition of the prime store locations.  
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4.1.2 Valuation Model 
 
 
4.1.2.1 Value of the Follower 
 
 
The Follower enters the market either jointly with his competitor or alone after the Leader’s 
entry. Introducing an entry barrier for the late-entry, the Follower’s investment can be 
presented by the following two functions.  
 
In the case of joint investment of the competitors, the Follower has no extra entry costs, and 
therefore the Joint Investment function of the standard model can be applied.  
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However, in the case of sequential entry the Follower has additional entry costs and therefore 
equation (16) should be rewritten by replacing I with kI, where k>1 holds: 
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4.1.2.2 Follower Entry Trigger 
 
 
The additional investment costs impact both dynamic NPV components of the Follower value. 
On the one hand, they reduce the intrinsic value of the Follower’s entry (static NPV value), 
while on the other hand they increase the time value of waiting (dynamic NPV component). 
Due to these impacts the entry decision of the Follower requires a higher level of host market 
demand potential at the date of investment. 
 
Compared to the standard Duopoly model, the Follower entry barrier moves the Follower 
value function downwards and consequently a later Follower’s investment trigger noted as 
bFt
X occurs.  
These results can formally be obtained by comparing equation (16) with equation (58) as 
follows: 
 
(59) [ )¥Î"< ;0)()( tttb XforXFXF  since 1k > and  
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since 1>k  holds 
 
The above results show that the additional entry costs in form of competitive disadvantage of 
the Follower deter the Follower entry making the competition in the new market after the 
Leader entry softer. 
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4.1.2.3 Optimal Joint Entry Threshold 
 
 
In the standard model the Joint Investment value function merged into the Follower’s value 
function at 
Ft
X , where the time value of immediate joint entry evaporated. Moving the 
Follower’s value function of the standard model downwards implies that the new Follower 
value function will cross the unchanged Joint investment value function at a single point of 
bJt
X , which occurs earlier than 
JF tt
XX = .86 
 
This new intersection point of optimal joint investment can be obtained by setting equation 
(57) equal to equation (58). The results are presented below:  
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Equation (61) expresses the following strategic value component of joint market entrance in 
the case of Follower’s entry barrier: 
 
Compared to the standard model the optimal joint entry date occurs earlier at 
bJt
X . At this 
lower level of host market demand potential the lost time value of earlier occurring normal 
investment costs is compensated by the present value of duopoly profits received in the 
restricted period between 
bJt
X  and 
bFt
X  increased with the present value of the saved 
additional entry costs.  
 
Compared to the standard model, the present value of saved additional entry costs, regarded 
as additional income of the Follower, make an earlier Joint entry at 
bJt
X  possible. This is a 
strategic value component, which is created by the opportunity of escaping from the 
additional entry costs, and which enhances the competition by reducing the time value of Joint 
market entry.  
 
As a result, in the absence of Leader entry the Follower’s entry barrier leads to an earlier 
optimal Joint Investment trigger than the standard model. 
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4.1.2.4 Market Entry Strategies of the Follower 
 
 
The following chart presents the value functions of the Follower and the Joint entry in the 
case of Follower’s entry barrier: 
Chart 7: Follower Entry with Barrier 
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The present value of the saved additional entry costs starts to compensate the lost time value 
of an immediate entry at 
bJt
X . To the right of 
bJt
X  the Joint Investment function is above, 
while to the left is below the downward shifted Follower’s function. This gives the following 
strategic instruction to the Follower:  
If the market maturity is below 
bJt
X , the Follower should wait and not enter the market.  
If the Leader entrance did not occur before 
bJt
X  the Follower should invest with probability 
one at this point in order to avoid the higher investment costs implied by a potential Leader 
entry. 
If the Leader entrance occurred before 
bJt
X  the Follower should wait with his entrance until 
an extended date of 
bFt
X , where the market starts to compensate the higher entry costs. The 
Follower entry barrier accelerates the optimal Joint investment while it deters the optimal 
Follower entry compared to the results of the standard model. These results are formally 
summarised by the following equations:  
 
(62)  X
bFFJbJ tttt
XXX <=<  
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4.1.2.5 Value of the Leader 
 
 
The Leader receives the same payouts as the Follower in the case of a Joint entry. However, if 
the joint investment does not occur, the extended date of the Follower’s entry presents longer 
monopoly profit tenure and consequently more valuable first mover advantage for the Leader. 
It needs to be observed that the more valuable first mover advantage allows for more loss in 
the time value of investment costs as compensation in the preemption game. As a 
consequence, compared to the standard model, the preemption point occurs earlier in time at a 
lower level of host market demand potential if the Follower entry barrier exists. Driven by the 
extended period of the monopoly profit, the value function of the Leader expressed by 
equation (35) moves upwards and an earlier date of Leader’s entry occurs at
bPt
X . These 
results are obtained by replacing  
FbF tt
XX >  into equation (35) as presented below: 
(63) 
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where 
bPt
X  is given by the solution of the below presented equation: 
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 and the following results hold: 
(65) 
PbP tt
XX < 87 and  
(66) )L(X)(XL ttb >
88  
                                                 
87Replacing 
PbP tt
XX =  in the equation (64) and applying equations (36) and (60) the following result is obtained: 
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4.1.2.6 Market Entry Strategy of the Leader 
 
 
Based on the transformed value functions of the Duopolist firms the following two potential 
Nash equilibria occur in the case of the Follower entry barrier: 
 
1. The first equilibrium (and the earlier one) occurs at 
PbP tt
XX < , which represents the 
crossing point of the new Leader and new Follower value functions. This investment 
trigger is the new preemption point, with exactly the same features as the preemption 
point of the standard model. As the additional investment costs of the Follower imply 
longer monopoly profit tenure of the Leader, the first mover advantage of the Leader 
increases and the new preemption point occurs earlier at a lower level of host market 
demand potential than in the standard model. At this point sequential equilibrium 
occurs, where one of the firms becomes the Leader with the probability of one half, 
while the other firm delays his market entry until 
bFt
X . 
 
2. The second equilibrium occurs at the matching point of the new Follower’s value 
function and the Joint investment value function at 
bJt
X . If neither of the competitors 
has invested up until this point, then a simultaneous joint market entrance occurs with 
probability one at 
bJt
X  as each firm has the intention to enter the market immediately 
in order to avoid the additional costs of the Follower entry barrier.  
 
Compared to the standard model the additional entry costs enhance competition and both 
the joint entry trigger and the preemption threshold also occur earlier at a lower level of 
host market demand potential. 
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Based on the above the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in the case of Follower’s 
entry barrier is given by the tuple of following closed-loop strategies 
( ) ( )( )
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to GGs 0,,, aa where 0³t  and  
 
(67) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
ï
í
ì
³
<£
+-
-
<
=
b
bb
b
J
JP
ttt
tt
P
ji
ttif
tttif
XFXJXL
XJXL
ttif
tG
1
2
0
/  
 
(68) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
ï
í
ì
³
<£
-
-
<
=
b
bb
b
J
JP
tt
tt
P
ji
ttif
tttif
XJXL
XFXL
ttif
t
1
0
/a  
where PP tt b <  and JJ tt b <  
 
Extension of the Standard Theoretical Market Entry Models 
 66 
It should be also observed that compared to the standard model the firm’s incentive to become 
the Leader becomes stronger for ÷
ø
öç
è
æÎ"
bJbP
ttt
XXX ; . This is due to the increased value of first 
mover advantage expressed by the ratio of 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )ttb
tbtb
XJXL
XFXL
-
- 89.  
 
As both firms become greedier to obtain the Leader role both invest with higher probability if 
( )
bJbP ttt
XXX ;Î . As a consequence the failure of suboptimal Joint entry increases compared 
to the results of the standard model.  
 
Applying the results of equation (55) and equation (68) the below chart presents the higher 
probability of suboptimal joint investment in the whole interval of host market demand 
potential: 
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(59) and (66) ( ) ( )ttb XLXL >  and ( ) ( )ttb XFXF < . 
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4.1.3 Conclusion 
 
 
The more intense competition driven by the more valuable first-mover-advantage accelerates 
the market entrance of the firms implying that (i) both the preemptive and the joint market 
entry equilibria occur earlier than in the standard model while (ii) the failure of suboptimal 
early joint entrance increases.  
 
As the chart below presents the entry barrier of the Follower increases the competition 
between the firms and further reduces the time value of waiting compared to the standard 
model. 
 
Chart 9: Endogenous Entry Strategies with Follower Entry Barrier 
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However, if the Leader’s entry was successful, then the Follower’s entry barrier has the 
opposite impact on the competition. The Follower entry occurs later at 
FbF tt
XX >  creating a 
longer tenure of monopolistic economy. 
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Existence of the Follower’s entry barrier intensifies the strategic impact of competition. In 
those Eastern European countries where access to prime retail locations was limited (e.g, due 
to higher customer concentration) first foreign retailers must have arrived at an earlier stage of 
host market demand potential and late entrants must have invested with increased time lag.  
As the empirical measurement of the existence of Follower entry barrier is very limited, this 
result has not been chosen to be tested explicitly. However, the impact of Follower’s entry 
barrier is in line with the strategic impact of competition, therefore its possible existence is 
not expected to imply any distortion of the empirical test results. 
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4.2 Asymmetric Firms in Duopoly Economy 
 
 
“If you are going to be a serious international player, you have to be one of the top two 
companies in a number of countries, which has sizable cash implications.” “In some ways we 
were disadvantaged, because other players had established a strong position in certain 
countries. But we had a very strong cash flow from the UK business, which gave us a strong 
start.”90 
 
 
4.2.1 Assumptions 
 
 
The previous models ignore the fact that competitors may differ from each other and may 
have unequal power to fight with each other. Asymmetry among competitors arises basically 
from differences in their operational and/or in their financial performance while such 
inequalities may have a significant impact on the investment strategy of the firms. 
 
Operational efficiency (fitness)91 is the result of higher profitability and is driven either by 
costs efficiency or by a better product/service portfolio.   
 
Financial competitive advantage (fatness)92 arises either from different capital structure 
(different financial leverage) or from unequal access to the capital markets. In both cases the 
cost of capital for the liquidity-constrained firm is higher than that of his competitor, who has 
better access to credit lines or to cash reserves. 
 
The next sections examine the impacts of asymmetry in the firms’ fitness and fatness on the 
market entry equilibria. 
 
                                                 
90Reid, D., deputy chairman of Tesco, 2002 The McKinsey Quarterly, Number 3 
91Expression originates from Lambrecht, 2001 The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a Duopoly, 
The Review of Financial Studies 
92Expression originates from Lambrecht, 2001 The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a Duopoly, 
The Review of Financial Studies 
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4.2.2 Impact of Fitness on the Market Entry Equilibrium 
 
 
Introducing asymmetry in the operational profitability of the firms implies that the market 
entrance has different value for the competitors.  
Assume that the operational profitability of firm A denoted by πA is lower than that of his 
competitor firm B denoted by πB. 
 
(69) AB kpp = , where ( )¥Î ;1k  
 
 
4.2.2.1 Value of the Follower 
 
 
Following the same procedure as that of the standard model, in the first step the Follower’s 
investment thresholds and value functions are calculated separately for the two firms.  
 
Substituting equation (69) into equation (17) shows that the Follower investment trigger of 
the weaker firm occurs later than that of his stronger counterpart: 
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As equation (16) is strictly positively increasing in the value of the profitability ratio π, the 
Follower’s value function of the stronger firm will always exceed that of the weaker firm and 
the following equation holds: 
 
(71) )()( tAtB XFXF > for all [ )¥Î ;0tX  
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4.2.2.2 Value of the Leader 
 
 
Based on equations (69) and (70), the Leader value functions of the two firms can be obtained 
in the next step.  
 
Each firm regards the Follower investment trigger of his counterpart as the potential end of 
his monopoly investment tenure. The stronger firm has a longer monopoly profit period than 
his weaker counterpart since 
AFt
X  occurs later than 
BFt
X . The present value of the higher 
monopoly profit per unit time realised during a longer monopoly investment tenure provides 
higher compensation for the up front investment costs of the stronger firm. The incremental 
benefit of the Leader role makes an earlier market entry of the stronger firm possible both in 
the case of exogenously and in the case of endogenously given roles. 
 
As the Leader value function presented by equation (35) strictly positively increases in the 
input parameters of 
Ft
X  and π93, the Leader value of the stronger firm always exceeds that of 
his weaker counterpart and the following equation holds:  
 
(72) )()( tAtB XLXL > for all [ )¥Î ;0tX  
 
In the next step of the analysis the preemption point of the Leader needs to be determined in 
order to find the optimal Leader market entry date assuming endogenous roles.  
Each firm determines his preemption point at the level of host market demand potential where 
the expected value of the Leader and the Follower investment strategies are the same and 
investors are indifferent to choosing the roles. Based on that criterion the following equations 
hold at the firms’ preemption points respectively: 
 
(73) )()(
BPBP tBtB
XFXL =  and  
 
(74) )()(
APAP tAtA
XFXL =  
                                                 
93Based on equation (35) the following results hold: 
0)( >
¶
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p
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¶
¶
F
t
X
XL  since 1>b , ( ) ( )21 DD >  and 
PF tt
XX >  
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Based on the requirements of equation (73) and (74) and applying the results of equations 
(71) and (72) the following results are obtained at the preemption points of the two competing 
firms:  
 
(75) )()()()(
BPBPBPBP tAtAtBtB
XLXFXFXL =>= , and  
 
(76) )()()()(
APAPAPAP tBtBtAtA
XLXFXFXL <<=   
 
As the Leader payoff of the stronger firm exceeds the Leader and the Follower value of the 
weaker firm at both firms’ preemption points, the rent equalisation between asymmetric 
competitors never occurs. 
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4.2.2.3 Strict Dominance 
 
 
Depending on the level of the asymmetry in the firms’ profitability the stronger firm’s 
Follower entry date occurs earlier than that of his competitor. The Leader market entry 
strategy provides additional monopoly profit flow for the weaker firm up until the early 
Follower arrival of his stronger competitor. However, opting for the Leader strategy the 
weaker firm gives up the time value of investment cost compared to his own Follower entry 
date. As a result the present value of the additional monopoly profit flow received by the 
weaker firm may not compensate the lost time value of his early entry costs if the asymmetry 
between the firms’ profitability exceeds a certain level and the lag between the two firms’ 
Follower entry thresholds becomes to large.  
 
In these situations the weaker firm can not increase his value by opting for the Leader strategy 
and his Leader value function melts down into his Follower value function. As a consequence 
the stronger firm will strictly dominate his weaker counterpart and can optimise his 
investment date by ignoring the move of his competitor. (This represents the same situation as 
if the Leader and Follower roles were defined exogenously.) The weaker firm enters the 
market as Leader only if his Leader role provides higher present value than his Follower role. 
Let denote this investment decision criterion by the following function:  
 
(77) 0)()()(/ >-=F tAtAtFL XFXLXAA   [ )BFAL ttt XXXfor ;Î"  
 
Applying the results of equations (16) and (35) the value of the above function can be 
expressed as follows94: 
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94The deduction of critical k value for the case of asymmetry in investment costs is presented by Huisman, 
K.J.M., 2001 Technology Investment: A Game Theoretical Real Option Approach, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston.  
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The standard duopoly model with symmetric competitors showed how the present value of 
the restricted monopoly profits compensates the lost time value of the earlier investment costs 
in the case of Leader entry.  
As the Follower entry thresholds of the asymmetric firms are different, the additional profit 
flow of the weaker firm’s Leader role consists of the following two components: 
 
(i) monopoly profit flow up until the arrival of the stronger competitor for [ )
BFAL ttt
XXX ;Î"  
and  
(ii) duopoly profit flow in the remaining period of [ )
AFBF ttt
XXX ;Î  until the weaker firm’s 
own Follower threshold.  
 
The weaker firm has no incentive to invest as Leader if the equation (77) does not hold. This 
means that the critical level of asymmetry noted as *k should meet the following condition: 
 
(79) 0)(/ =F tFL XAA  [ )BFAL ttt XXXfor ;Î"  
Substituting equations (69) and (70) into equation (78) gives the following expression for 
equation (78): 
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As the Leader value function of the weaker firm should be tangent to his Follower’s value 
function the first derivative of equation (80) by tX  should also equal zero. This can be 
formally expressed as follows: 
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After multiplying both sides of equation (82) by 
b
tX  and subtracting it from equation (80 the 
following expression is obtained for tX . 
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Finally substituting the results of equations (83) and (70) into equation (80) the following 
value is calculated for the critical level of asymmetry noted as *k : 
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One firm strictly dominates its rival if the asymmetry between the competitors’ profitability 
equals or exceeds the above defined critical level of *k . 
 
                                                 
95One can see that k*>1 holds, by rearranging equation (84) into the following form: 
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Equation (84) shows that the value of *k  depends not only on the level of incremental benefit 
of becoming the monopolist but also on common economic indicators of the host market, 
which both firms have in common such as volatility ( )s , profit growth ( )m  and discount rate 
( )r 96. 
As the level of critical asymmetry is quite a complicated function of these common economic 
indicators extensive numerical simulations have been chosen to analyse these factors’ impact 
instead of the analytical solution. The simulations indicate the following results97: 
 
(85) 0
*
<
¶
¶
s
k ; 0
*
<
¶
¶
m
k  and 0
*
>
¶
¶
r
k . 
 
These results show that the critical level of asymmetry is mitigated or strengthened by 
common economic factors depending on how the present value of the excess profit flow of an 
earlier entry can compensate the lost time value of early investment costs: 
 
· Increase in host market volatility favours the weaker firm. As uncertainty increases the 
time value of waiting, the optimal entry triggers of the weaker firm (both Leader and 
Follower entry dates) occur at a higher level of market demand potential. In this 
interval the weaker firm gains higher monopoly and duopoly profit per unit time for 
the earlier entry, while the loss time value of his investment costs per unit time are 
independent from the level of market maturity and remain therefore unchanged.  
· Higher discount rate is to the relative advantage of the stronger firm. Higher discount 
rate reduces the present value of additional monopoly and duopoly profits and 
increases the time value of investment costs.  
· Higher profit growth of the host market benefits the weaker firm. Higher profit growth 
increases the present value of the restricted monopoly and duopoly profits, while time 
value of investment costs remains unchanged. 
                                                 
96The common economic indicators drive the level of *k  since 
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97Similar procedures can be found in Lambrecht, 2001 The Impact of Debt Financing on Entry and Exit in a 
Duopoly, The Review of Financial Studies.  
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The charts below present the sensitivity of *k  values for the change in common economic 
factors: 
 
Chart 10: k* Sensitivity 
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Chart 11: k* Sensitivity 
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Chart 12: k* Sensitivity 
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4.2.2.4 Market Entry Strategies in Strict Dominance  
 
 
If the level of asymmetry equals or exceeds a critical level of *k then the weaker firm has no 
intention to become the Leader and his Leader value function melts down into his Follower 
value function.  
 
As a result the stronger firm strictly dominates his weaker competitor and a sequential 
equilibrium occurs where the weaker firm enters the market with probability one only at 
( ) I
D
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A
m
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=  and the stronger firm can simply maximize his investment opportunity 
by investing with probability one at the optimal Leader threshold of ( ) I
D
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B
m
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b
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-
= .  
 
These closed loop strategies of the firms if *kk ³ are given below:  
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4.2.2.5 Market entry Strategies in Lack of Strict Dominance 
 
 
If the level of asymmetry is below the critical level of *k  then the equilibrium depends on the 
initial level of host market demand potential.  
 
For [ )¥Î" ;
AFtt
XX  the market maturity has reached the level where both firms enter the 
market simultaneously with probability one. This implies the following closed loop strategy 
sets of the firms: 
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For [ )
AFAP ttt
XXX ;Î"  one should observe that the weaker firm has only incentive to 
preempt his stronger competitor in a restricted period and not in the whole interval. Between 
the Follower entry threshold of the stronger firm and his own Follower entry trigger, the 
weaker firm receives the duopoly profits, which do not compensate the time value of his 
earlier investment costs by definition. (This compensation occurs first at his optimal Follower 
entry trigger.) Therefore there exists a period before the optimal Follower trigger of the 
weaker firm where his Leader value function is below his Follower value function. 
Consequently the weaker firm’s Leader and Follower value functions have two intersection 
points (noted as 
1APAP
tt XX =  and 
2AP
tX  where 
21 APAP
tt XX <  holds) which separate the market 
entry equilibria of asymmetric firms as follows. 
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For [ )
AFAP ttt
XXX ;
2
Î"  the stronger firm B enters the market for sure, since the joint market 
entrance has positive time value for the weaker firm up until 
AFt
X  by definition. As a result 
sequential equilibrium occurs where the stronger firm invests immediately and becomes the 
Leader with probability one and the weaker firm enters the market with the same probability 
as Follower at 
AFt
X . The closed loop strategy sets are obtained as follows: 
 
 
 
(88)  
 
 
 
 
 
For [ )
21
;
APAP ttt
XXX Î"  both firms intend to be the Leader and try to preempt his competitor. 
The value of the market entrance for the two asymmetric firms can be expressed therefore as 
follows: 
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Equations (86) can be rewritten as below: 
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Applying the first order conditions the following solutions are obtained for Aa  and Ba : 
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(91) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )tAtA
tAtA
B
tBtB
tBtB
A
XJXL
XFXL
XJXL
XFXL
-
-
=
-
-
=
a
a
 
where based on equations (71) and (72) AB aa < holds
98. 
 
The above results reveal how one firm’s competitive advantage depends on the comparative 
strength of his competitor. Although both firms intend to enter the market, one firm’s 
incentive to invest in the new market (expressed by BA /a  respectively) depends on the payoffs 
of his counterpart, which reflect the competitor’s ability to react to one firm’s action.  
In the race for the Leader role, the increase in the incremental benefit of one firm’s potential 
Leader position should enhance the incentive of the other firm to challenge his counterpart. 
As a result the weaker firm needs to have a more aggressive investment strategy and should 
increase the probability of his market entrance in line with the incremental benefit of his 
stronger competitor in order to keep his opponent despite his comparative strength indifferent 
to opting for the Leader/Follower investment strategies.  
 
Based on the previous calculations the asymmetric firms closed loop strategy sets for 
[ )
21
;
APAP ttt
XXX Î"  are as follows: 
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For [ )
1
;0
APtt
XX Î"  the stronger firm will always preempt his competitor, since the weaker 
firm has an incentive to become the Leader only at 
1AP
tX .  
 
This preemption occurs either  
 
(i) immediately before 
1AP
tX (e -preemption) or 
(ii) at 
BLt
X , if the optimal Leader threshold of the stronger firm is before the preemption 
point of the weaker firm99.  
 
Based on the above the closed loop equilibrium strategies are given as follows: 
If 
1APBL
tt XX < , then 
 
(93) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
ïî
ï
í
ì
³
<
=
ïî
ï
í
ì
³
<
=
ïî
ï
í
ì
³
<
=
ïî
ï
í
ì
³
<
=
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
L
L
B
L
L
B
F
F
A
F
F
A
ttif
ttif
t
ttif
ttif
tG
ttif
ttif
t
ttif
ttif
tG
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
a
a
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
98The joint investment function based on equation (18) is strictly positively increasing in π ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ >
¶
¶
0
p
tXJ , 
therefore ( ) ( )tAtB XJXJ >  also holds. 
99In that case the asymmetry between the firms makes it possible for the stronger firm to ignore the action of his 
competitor so that the stronger firm can act as a Leader with exogenously given role. However, compared to 
the situation of strong dominance preemption games between the firms may occur in certain subgames, which 
are starting at [ )
21
;
APAP ttt
XXX Î .  
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If 
APBL tt
XX ³  then 
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4.2.2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
As the following chart shows, in the case of asymmetric firms, the weaker firm’s monopoly 
investment tenure depends on his stronger competitor’s Follower investment threshold, which 
occurs sooner than his own Follower entry.  
 
Chart 13: Asymmetric Firms below the Critical k* Level 
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If the asymmetry of the firms exceeds a certain level, then the weaker firm can not pre-empt 
his competitor and his Leader value function melts down into his Follower value function. 
Consequently, the weaker firm will only invest at his Follower investment trigger and the 
stronger firm can maximise the time value of his Leader entry by investing at this optimal 
Leader threshold. As a result competition will have no impact on the market entry timing of 
firms. 
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Chart 14: Asymmetric Firms above the Critical k* Level 
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If the asymmetry of firms is below the critical level then the market entry equilibria depends 
on the initial value of the host market demand potential. 
 
If [ )
10
;0
APt
XX Î , then the preemption point of the weaker firm 
1AP
X , can not be regarded as a 
real preemption point, since the Leader market entrance of the weaker firm does not represent 
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The Leader value function of the stronger firm always 
exceeds his competitor’s Leader value function therefore the stronger firm has an incentive to 
ε pre-empt his weaker counterpart. As a consequence sequential equilibrium occurs, where the 
stronger firm becomes the Leader and the weaker firm will be the Follower. 
 
If [ )¥Î ;
20 APt
XX , then the weaker firm has no incentive to be Leader since his monopoly 
profit tenure is too short to compensate the lost time value of his investment costs. The Leader 
value function of the weaker firm is therefore below of his Follower value function and a 
sequential equilibrium occurs, where the stronger firm enters the market immediately and the 
weaker firm invests at his Follower’s entry trigger.  
 
However, if [ ]
210
;
AA PPt
XXX Î , then both firms want to be the Leader and enter the market 
with positive probability. Following the same steps as in the standard model for the 
determination of endogenously given Leader and Follower roles and introducing αi for the 
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notation of the probability that the firm { }BAi ;Î  invests, the following equilibria can be 
obtained: 
 
· Firm A enters the market as the Leader with the probability of 
BABA
BA
aaaa
aa
-+
- )1( at 
0t
X , 
and firm B invests as Follower at 
BF
X . 
· Firm B enters the market as the Leader with the probability of 
ABAB
AB
aaaa
aa
-+
- )1( at 
0t
X , 
and firm A invests as Follower at 
AF
X . 
· both firms invest at 
0t
X with the probability of 
ABAB
AB
aaaa
aa
-+
 
 
where based on equation (91) the probability that firm A/B invests can be expressed as 
)()(
)()(
//
//
/
tABtAB
tABtAB
BA XJXL
XFXL
-
-
=a . 
 
Although both firms opt for the Leader role in this interval, the larger is the asymmetry 
between the firms, the higher is the probability that the stronger firm wins the market entry 
game and the lower is the probability of suboptimal joint investment.  
 
Chart 15: Probability of Joint Entry with Asymmetric Firms 
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4.2.3  Impact of Fatness on the Market Entry Equilibrium 
 
 
Fatness or financial competitive advantage may occur in the case of one firm’s lower financial 
leverage and/or in the case of one firm’s better access to cheaper credit lines.  
 
Suspending the assumption that the market entry of firms is entirely financed with equity and 
introducing b  for the notation of interest payment per unit of time, the firm’s profit curve can 
be rewritten as follows100: 
 
(95) ( )[ ] bXtQDtP tEBIT -= p)(  
 
Assuming, that firm B has cheaper debt financing or lower financial leverage than firm A 
leads to the following relation between the discounted values of the firms’ profit per unit time: 
 
(96) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
m
p
m
p
-
-
<
-
-
B
BtEBIT
A
AtEBIT
r
bXtQD
r
bXtQD
BA  , since  
 
BA bb >  and 
 
AB rr <  as the levered discount rate is lower for firm B than for firm A. 
 
As equation (96) is equivalent to equation (69), the asymmetry in fatness has the same impact 
on the market entry equilibrium as the asymmetry in fitness and makes the competition 
between firms softer.  
 
 
                                                 
100For simplicity reasons the impact of taxation is ignored in the analysis. 
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4.2.3.1 Impact of Risk Aversion 
 
As risk averse investors discount the values of the same uncertain profit curve with higher 
discount rate than their risk neutral counterparts, the same results as presented in the previous 
sections are obtained if one of the competitors is assumed to be more risk averse than the 
other. 
 
The earlier the market entry happens, the larger is the portion of the uncertain future growth in 
the present value of the investment. As risk averse investors punish the uncertainty with a 
higher discount rate, the time value of their market entry is higher and their entry date 
postpones.  
 
Consequently, the more risk averse the investors are, the more latecomers they will be by 
nature and the softer the market entry competition will be. 
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4.2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
In the case of asymmetric competitors, depending on the initial level of the market maturity 
and the level of asymmetry between the firms the following types of equilibria may occur: 
1. Pre-emptive equilibrium occurs if the asymmetry is below a certain critical level and 
the initial level of host market demand potential is in the preemption interval of the 
weaker firm. In that case both firms have the incentive of becoming the Leader at the 
same time, resulting in the same preemption game as that of the standard model. 
However, contrary to the standard model, the stronger firm’s chances of becoming the 
Leader proportionally increase with the level of asymmetry among the firms’ 
profitability. 
2. Sequential equilibrium occurs, when the difference in the cost asymmetry is so 
significant that one firm strictly dominates the other or the market entry game starts 
either before or after the intersection points of the weaker firm’s Leader and Follower 
value functions. In these cases the stronger firm’s competitive advantage is large 
enough to deter the weaker firm from entering the market as Leader. Because of the 
asymmetry, the stronger firm is not forced by the competition to enter the market at 
his preemption point and therefore the rent equalisation of the firms never occurs. 
3. Simultaneous equilibrium occurs only if the initial level of market maturity is above 
the Follower investment trigger of the weaker firm. In that case the market demand is 
large enough for two firms to enter the market jointly. 
Unlike as in the case of the Follower’s entry barrier, asymmetry between the rivals always 
mitigates the competition in the market entry process. The softer competition does not force 
the stronger firm to enter the market at his preemption point and as a consequence the rent 
equalisation between the firms does not occur. 
 
Comparative strength of Western European retailers in terms of operational and/or financial 
profitability must have increased the probability that “fitter” and/or “fatter” retailers entered 
the Eastern European countries earlier than their weaker competitors. Retailer giants such as 
e.g. REWE, Tesco, Metro, Schwarz Group, Tengelmann invested in significantly more 
Eastern European countries than their counterparts with smaller home market shares during 
the analysed period.  
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4.3 Market Entry in an Oligopoly Economy with More than Two Competing 
Firms 
 
 
"We are seeing a shake-out of underperforming companies in certain countries because 
everybody wants to be in the top three in a country. If you are seventh, eighth or ninth, then 
you're not in the game."101 
 
 
4.3.1 Assumptions 
 
 
Extending the standard market entry model of duopoly economy is straightforward to the case 
where 2>n  firms enter the same new market.  
 
The first arriving firm receives the monopoly profit until the entrance of the second firm. 
After the second arrival both firms acting on the new market realise the duopoly profit up 
until the investment of the third competitor and with every additional entry each firm gets 
continuously decreasing profit shares. 
 
The analysis presented in this section assumes the subsequent arrival of firms. The same 
results hold in the case of optimal joint investment of [ ]n;2jÎ  firms at the optimal entry date 
of the [ ]nji ;i th Î  arriving firm if j-ik =  competitor(s) entered the market before. These 
optimal joint entries of firms occur by coincidence if the demand potential of the host market 
starts at [ )
1iPiP ttt
X;XX
+
Î . 
                                                 
101Roberts, B., global retail analyst, 2006 The grocers' global battlefield, Internet 
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4.3.2 Symmetric Firms  
 
 
4.3.2.1 Value Functions 
 
 
The entry threshold of the firms is calculated backwards by the determination of the market 
entry threshold of the latest arrival. The firm, which arrives finally, receives the smallest 
market share of D(n). His entry trigger can be obtained by applying the Follower’s value 
function as follows.  
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Fixing the entry date of the final rival, the entry triggers of all previously arriving firms can be 
calculated repeatedly with the Leader value function. Since the firms receive a periodically 
decreasing profit share with the subsequent arrival of the remaining competitors, the Leader 
value function needs to be slightly modified with regard to the staggered decreasing profit 
flow as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(99)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where )(XL ti  denotes the Leader value of the firm which enters the new market in which 
already [ )1;01-i -Î n  competitors have already invested and [ )¥Î ;0P i  denotes his 
preemption date (or the earliest joint entry date for [ )n;0i Î  firms). 
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4.3.2.2 Optimal Entry Triggers 
 
 
Following the same argument as presented in the analysis of duopoly economy one firm is 
motivated to enter a new market where already [ )1;01-i -Î n  of his competitors are active as 
long as the accumulated present value of the restricted profit flow of ( )iDp  per unit time 
exceeds or at least compensates the time value of the earlier investment costs.  
The firm receives the restricted profit flow of ( )iDp  per unit time up until the arrival of an 
additional competitor. This occurs at the optimal joint entry date for [ )1;11i +Î+ n  firms 
noted by 
1+iPt
X . The firm loses the time value of investment costs also compared to 
1+iPt
X , 
since 
1+iPt
X  represents the firm’s next optimal entry date if [ )n;1i Î  firms have already 
invested. 
 
Driven by the macroeconomic growth rate in the Wiener process of the profit curve, the 
compensation for the time value of investment costs decreases continuously with each unit of 
time going back from 
1+iPt
X .102 
 
Based on the above the optimal entry date for the [ )n;1ii th Î  arriving competitor noted by 
iPt
X  is determined by the equilibrium where the investor is indifferent between investing or 
waiting until the next optimal entry trigger at 
1+iPt
X . This equilibrium requirement can be 
formally expressed as follows: 
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102The time value of investment costs remains unchanged per each unit time due to the assumptions of flat 
market yield curve and fixed investment costs. This ensures that the compensation will not occur beyond a 
certain timeframe going back from 
1+iP
X  and a new preemption point of 
iP
X  is obtained as soon as the net 
present value of the earlier market entry has been completely eliminated. This requirement is formally 
expressed by equation (100). 
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4.3.2.3 Example: Oligopoly Economy with Three Competing Firms  
 
 
Applying the previously presented procedure the value functions of the individual investors 
determine the following optimal entry dates of the firms if three identical firms compete for 
entering a host market. 
 
First, the third (latest) entry is determined by applying the Follower value function of 
equation (97) as presented below: 
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The third firm simply maximises the time value of his investment as no further entry is 
expected. His optimal entry date is obtained as follows: 
 
(103) ( )( )3133 D
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Fixing the optimal entry date of the third investor, the value function of the second investor 
with the restricted period of excess duopoly profit stream can be obtained by applying the 
Leader value function as presented by equation (99):  
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Applying the equilibrium requirement expressed under equation (100) the preemption point 
of the second investor denoted by 
2Pt
X  is given by the solution of the following equation103: 
 
(105) ( )( ) ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-=
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
- =
-
=
bb
m
p
33
2
33
2
2
112
1
FP
P
FP
P
P
tt
t
tt
t
t
m X
X
I
X
X
X
r
D  
 
                                                 
103Due to the competition between the last two investors the second entrant can accelerate his investment 
compared to the third arrival as long as the present value of the restricted duopoly profits compensates the time 
value of early investment costs. The preemption point occurs if the excess profit of early investment has been 
completely eliminated.  
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Finally, with respect to the optimal arrival date of the second and third arrivals, the value 
function of the first investor with a restricted excess monopoly and duopoly profit period can 
be obtained based on equation (99) as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(106) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The preemption point for the first entry denoted by 
1Pt
X occurs at the solution of the following 
equation104: 
 
(107) ( )( ) ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-=
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-
- bb
m
p
2
1
2
1
1
111
1
P
P
P
P
P
t
t
t
t
t
m X
X
I
X
X
X
r
D  
 
                                                 
104Compared to the preemption point of the second entrance the first entry can be accelerated as long as the 
present value of the restricted monopoly profits compensates the time value of investment costs.  
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The picture below depicts the value functions and optimal market entry dates of three 
identical firms in oligopoly economy based on the results as presented under equations (102) 
(104) and (106):  
 
Chart 16: Oligopoly Economy with Three Identical Firms 
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4.3.2.4 Comparative Analysis 
 
 
Two opposing impacts drive the optimal entry date of the firms in oligopoly economy. 
 
1. On the one hand driven by the preemption process of endogenously given roles, the 
optimal entry date for the ( )thn 1-  arrival in the case of n  competing firms 
(representing the endogenous joint entry date of 1-n  competitors) occurs earlier than 
the optimal last arrival in the case of 1-n  competing firms (representing the 
exogenous joint entry date of 1-n  firms). This is due to the same strategic impact of 
competition (preemption process) as presented under the comparative analysis of 
endogenous Leader versus Monopoly market entry.  
2. On the other hand however, one should observe that this strategic impact implicates a 
shorter profit tenure with ( )2-nDp  profit flow per unit time for the first 2-n  
entrants in the case of an economy with n  competitors compared to the case of 1-n  
competing firms. Driven by the positive drift in the Wiener process of the profit curve, 
the wedge between the optimal exogenously and endogenously defined entry dates of 
the ( )thn 1-  investor represents an investment period for the ( )thn 2-  arriving firm 
where the present value of his profit flow exceeds the time value of his investment 
costs per each unit time105. This accumulated net present value of investment makes 
possible that compared to the endogenously defined entry dates of the ( )thn 1- investor 
the firm which is arriving as number ( )2-n  on the new market can further accelerate 
his entry if he faces only one additional competitor (case of 1-n  firms) rather that two 
remaining competitors (case of n  firms).106.  
 
The following section compares the occurrence of optimal entry dates of the first and second 
investors between the duopoly case and the oligopoly case with three firms. The aim of the 
analysis is to present the effects of these two opposing impacts on the optimal entry dates. 
                                                 
105 The formal proof is presented in the next section. 
106 In case of exogenously given firm roles the optimal entry date of each investor will coincide independently 
from the number of competitors (in the absence of competitions all firms can simply maximize the time value 
of investments costs).  
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4.3.2.5 Optimal Entry Triggers  
 
 
Driven by the strategic impact of competition the entry thresholds of the second investor in 
oligopoly economy with three identical competitors will occur earlier than the optimal 
Follower entry date of the duopoly model.  
This can be formally proved by seeing that the second investor of an oligopoly with three 
competitors is not indifferent between investing and waiting at the optimal Follower threshold 
of the duopoly case noted by 
Ft
X .  
Define the function ( )tX1F  based on equation (105) as follows: 
 
(108) ( ) ( )( ) ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
--
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-
=F
- bb
m
p
33
112
1
1
FF t
t
t
t
t
m
t X
XI
X
XX
r
DX  
 
Replacing the value of 
Ftt
XX =  based on equation (17) into the above equation and applying 
the results of equation (98) for the value of 
3Ft
X  the following results are obtained: 
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0
2
3
1 <
¶
F¶
D
D
X
Ft ; 1>b  and ( )( ) ( )1;02
3
Î
D
D  hold. 
 
The result of equation (109) shows that the investment has a positive value for the arrival of 
the second of three competitors at the optimal Duopoly Follower entry date. This positive 
value of investment implicates that the second investor can further accelerate his market entry 
beyond 
Ft
X  to preempt the third competitor and 
FP tt
XX <
2
 holds. 
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Due to this strategic impact of competition between the third and the second investors, the 
first investor faces shorter monopoly profit tenure with lower compensation for the time value 
of his investment costs in the case of three competing firms compared to the case of two 
competitors.  
 
The first investor’s profit flow per unit time noted by ( )1Dp  overcompensates the time value 
of investment costs if [ ]¥Î ;
Mtt
XX . Therefore the wedge between 
2Pt
X  and 
Ft
X  implies that 
the first investor looses positive net present value of investment in the case of facing two 
rather that one competitor if 
2PM tt
XX £  holds.  
 
Based on equation (105) the present value of the restricted duopoly profit of the second 
arriving firm at the Monopoly entry is obtained as follows.  
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Since the compensation of the early entry for the restricted duopoly profit flow starts at 
2Pt
X  
by definition, one can show that 
2PM tt
XX <  holds by proving that ( ) 02 <F MtX .  
 
Replacing the values of 
Mt
X  and 
3Ft
X  based on equations (9) and (103) into equation (110) 
the following result is obtained: 
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The result of equation (111) implicates that due to the earlier arrival of the second firm the 
monopoly investment tenure is less valuable if the first investor faces two competitors rather 
than one. As a consequence the first arriving firm in an oligopoly economy with three 
competitors can not afford to accelerate his entry up until the Leader preemption point of the 
duopoly economy and 
1PP tt
XX <  will hold.  
 
This result can be formally proved as follows: 
Define the function ( )tX3F  based on equation (107) as follows: 
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Replacing the value of the Leader preemption point in duopoly economy based on equation 
(36) into the above equation the following result is obtained: 
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107 After replacing the result of equation (9) the following equation is obtained: 
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The below chart presents the effect of competition in the case of three identical firms of an 
Oligopoly economy versus two identical firms of a Duopoly economy: 
 
Chart 17: Comparative Analysis with Duopoly and Oligopoly Economies 
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4.3.2.6 Optimal Entry Strategies 
 
 
The increase in the number of competitors impacts not only the optimal entry dates of the 
investors but it also influences the probability of becoming the Leader role at the individual 
preemption points respectively.  
 
 
At the first preemption point noted by 
1´ Pt
X one firm’s value is obtained by the following 
equation: 
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where )tXJ (2  denotes the payoffs if two firms and )tXJ (3  denotes the payoffs if three firms 
enter the market simultaneously at the same time and kji //a  presents the probability that firm 
i/j/k chooses the option of market entrance. 
 
Applying the first order condition on the above equation and substituting aaaa === kji  for 
symmetric firms the following expression is obtained for the value of one firm’s market 
entrance at the beginning of the game: 
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Driven by the rent equalisation, risk neutral investors will be indifferent between waiting and 
investing at every preemption point. Consequently the incentive for the market entrance noted 
by a  goes to zero at 
1Pt
X  and each firm will become the Leader with the probability of 
3
1  
and the Follower with the probability of 
3
2 . 
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Compared to the duopoly case, where the probability of the Leader and the Follower roles 
equalled to 
2
1 , the results of equation (115) indicate that the increased number of competitors 
decreases the chances for one firm to become the Leader and enhances the probability of 
becoming the Follower.  
 
 
At the second preemption point noted by 
2Pt
X three outcomes are possible109.  
 
1. The simplest one is the case where two firms already entered the market before that 
point. As the market entry for an additional third competitor is not optimal, the 
remaining firm waits until the market maturity reaches the optimal investment 
threshold for a third competitor. 
 
2. According to the second alternative, one firm has already invested before this trigger. 
In that case the roles of second and third entrant will be distributed between the 
remaining two firms based on the same calculation procedure as the Leader and 
Follower roles were allocated in the duopoly analysis.  
 
3. The last possible outcome is that neither firm has invested up until that threshold110. 
This implicates that it will be optimal for two firms to invest simultaneously and the 
remaining third should enter the market at the next Follower threshold. The problem 
with this situation is that continuity may disappear in some subgames as the following 
examples show111: 
 
Firm i will be in the lucky pair of companies with the following probability: 
 
(116) )) - (1+)) - (1 tkjitkji XLXL (( aaaaaa  
 
                                                 
109The sub optimal outcome of the game where all three firms already entered the market before this optimal 
trigger is not analysed as it is out of importance.  
110This happens if the game starts at this point of host market demand potential.  
111Similar explanation can be obtained from Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., 1985 Preemption and Rent 
equalization in the Adaption of New Technology, Review of Economic Studies. However, these authors’ 
argument is not detailed in the same way.  
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However, with a remaining probability of )() - )(1 - (1 tkji XLaaa  firm i may have 
entered the market before neither of his competitors made his own entry decision. In 
that case the market entry game is repeated for the remaining two firms and with 
probability kjaa  the suboptimal triple joint entry may occur in this second round. If 
this outcome happens firm i should leave his optimal entry path for the suboptimal 
joint entry.  
 
The same type of discontinuity happens in all cases where one firm has already made 
his entry decision without the commitment of at least one of his competitors. In the 
case of analysing firm i’s entry decision these remaining probabilities are as follows: 
 
(117) ( ) ( ) )) - (1-+)) - (1- tkjitkji XFXF (1(1 aaaaaa ,  
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4.3.3 Asymmetric Firms 
 
 
In the case of more than two asymmetric competitors the order of the market entrance among 
the firms should be determined by applying the following procedure:  
 
Step 1:  The latest investment triggers of two randomly selected firms are calculated. The firm 
with the earlier last investment threshold will be removed from the list and the 
algorithm will be repeated by 1-n  times. At the end of this procedure the weakest 
firm is identified and is taken out from the sample. Applying this algorithm 
iteratively one can obtain the order of the market entrance in the oligopoly 
backwards.  
 
Step 2:  In the next step the entry threshold of the firms needs to be determined. The process 
should start backwards with the determination of the market entry threshold of the 
weakest competitor. As the weakest firm arrives finally he receives the smallest 
market share of D(n). After the entry trigger of the weakest firm has been obtained 
with the Follower value function, applying the Leader value function repeatedly, the 
entry trigger of the next weakest firm can be calculated as long as the first entry date 
is obtained.  
 
However, it should be noted that in the case of asymmetric firms the market entry game has 
different continuations depending on which firm has entered the market first and with unequal 
continuation payoffs different firms have different strategic value of investing first.112 
 
                                                 
112A more detailed explanation can be obtained from Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. 1985 Preemption and Rent 
equalization in the Adaption of New Technology, Review of Economic Studies. Fudenberg and Tirole 
concluded that preemption need not enforce rent equalisation in case of more than two asymmetric firms. It 
should be noted that this is already the case with two asymmetric firms as presented in the previous chapter. 
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4.3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
Generally two opposing impacts influence the optimal market entry date of investors if the 
competition intensifies due to the increase in the number of potential entrants.  
 
On the one hand one additional competitor accelerates the entry of the next to last ( )thn 1-  
firm driven by the preemption process. However, on the other hand the early ( )thn 1- arrival 
implicates shorter ( )2-nD  profit tenure for the previously arrived firms deterring the optimal 
( )thn 2-  preemption point. This process continues iteratively113 up until the investment of the 
first firm. Since the investment costs are assumed to be fixed and unchanged the positive drift 
in the Wiener process of the profit flow distributes a continuously decreasing weight to each 
impact going backwards. As a consequence the market entry date of the first investor in the 
case of 3³n  competing firms occurs between the first entry date of the cases with 2-n  and 
1-n  competitors.  
 
This means that the earliest first market entry date occurs in duopoly economy and each 
additional competitor delays the first market entrance compared to the Duopolist Leader 
preemption point. However, one needs to observe that one additional competitor accelerates 
the first market entry if the number of competing firms excluding him is odd and has the 
reverse impact if it is even.  
 
It needs to be further observed that in the case of more than two competitors continuation may 
disappear in some subgames of the market entry game as a result of which no closed loop 
market entry strategy set exists. Moreover the chance of obtaining the Leader role decreases 
with the increase in the number of competitors and risk neutral players should risk more to get 
the expected value of the Follower strategy. This implicates that the increase in the number of 
competitors further deters the geographic market entrance in the case the investors are risk 
adverse. 
 
                                                 
113The extended ( )thn 2- preemption date represents a longer ( )3-nD  profit tenure intensifying the 
competition and accelerating the ( )thn 3-  arrival etc… 
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The theoretical results indicate, that Western European retailers deterred their investment 
decision in the Eastern European countries in those years when the number of competitors 
expected to invest in the near future exceeded a certain level. In the middle of the 90s foreign 
retailers entered jointly in great numbers especially in Poland and the Czech Republic as these 
countries presented the highest level of host market demand potential. It is therefore important 
to test a possible dual impact of expected level of competition in order to avoid distortion of 
the empirical test results and parameterise the empirical model properly. 
  
5 Empirical Evidence for the Strategic Value of Investment 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
Retail industry has become increasingly global in the recent decades. In the 90s Western 
European retailers were suffering from saturated home markets, cut-thought competition and 
restrictive legislation. Moreover, the combined home market share of the top five grocery 
retailers exceeded 70%, indicating a high concentration rate among the players. As a not 
surprising consequence the fierce market share races on the home markets pushed Western 
retailers to go globally and to search for new markets abroad 114. 
 
In 2003 the top 30 food retailers have extended their operation in 85 different countries 
increasing their market presence by several times of the 15 countries which their operation 
covered a decade earlier115. Although two of three retailers failed to meet their financial 
targets after entering a developing country, going global remained a key element in the 
retailers’ growth strategy.  
 
Following the market opening of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe a 
significant growth opportunity with untapped market potential has been opened up for 
Western European retailers. However, entry patterns to Eastern Europe as target market 
varied substantially across firms and host markets. On the one hand, some target markets like 
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were more popular and attracted more foreign retailers 
with earlier investment than others (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria). On the other hand, some 
competitors preferred an earlier entry into the same countries compared to their rivals (e.g. 
REWE showed up generally earlier than Metro in the Eastern European countries). 
 
This chapter presents the result of an empirical study examining the market entry behaviour of 
Western European retailers in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes in these 
                                                 
114A.T. Kearney for example argued that the industry is becoming increasingly global as (i) the size of middle 
and upper middle income groups is growing in most countries; (ii) retailers dramatically increased their global 
coverage, and (iii) the time period necessary for the developing markets to move from the traditional to 
modern retail shortened significantly. (Farra, F., A.T. Kearney and Bell, D., Globalisation strategies: How to 
crack new markets, EFB issue 25) 
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countries.116 The aim of the empirical analysis is to test the results of the theoretical models 
set up in the previous chapters. The focus of the tests is to analyse the length of time to the 
occurrence of an event (the market entry of Western European retailers) and to test the impact 
of some selected economic indicators and the intensity of competition on the duration of 
waiting.  
 
The database used in this study was mainly provided by planetretail.net and the empirical tests 
have been carried out by the statistical software STATA/SE 8.0 for Windows.  
                                                                                                                                                        
115 A.T. Kearney, 2003 Global Retail Development Index, Internet 
116Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G., 2004 How to Seize a Window of Opportunity: The Entry Strategy of Retail 
Firms into Transitional Ecomomies, ERIM Report Series Research in Management present a very similar 
empirical study on entry patterns of Western European retailer into Eastern Europe including the analysis of 
speed and size of entry. The reason for choosing the same field of research was to extend and to change at 
some places the authors’ model specification in order to better reflect the results of the theoretical models and 
to focus on a deeper analysis of the “speed of entry”. Changes have been made in various stages of the 
empirical testing. These are noted at the place of their relevance.  
Empirical Evidence for the Strategic Value of Investment  
 111 
5.2 Hypotheses 
 
 
The aim of the empirical test is to measure and analyse the speed of market entry of top 
Western European grocery retailers in the Eastern European countries. The analysis focuses 
on the measurement of each value component of the market entrance including:  
 
1. the static or intrinsic value component,  
2. the dynamic or time value component and 
3.  the strategic value component  
 
The empirical test measures the impact of common macroeconomic indicators and the effect 
of competition on the timing of foreign firms’ arrival.  
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5.2.1 Explanatory Variables  
 
 
5.2.1.1 Host Market’s Attractiveness  
 
 
Host market attractiveness is measured by the demand potential ( )tX  and is assumed to 
accelerate the market entrance by increasing the intrinsic value of the investment (results of 
Chapter 3.2).  
The demand potential is measured by the following macroeconomic indicators as continuous 
explanatory variables117 in the empirical tests: 
 
1. GPD per capita in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards)118 has been selected to define the 
average host market demand potential at time t. The volume index of GDP per capita in 
PPS is expressed in relation to the European Union average. This eliminates the 
differences in price levels between countries allowing for meaningful cross country 
comparison rather than for temporal comparison.119 
In order to measure the impact of increase in GDP per capita significantly, the scale of 
increase in the variable was set to thousand $. 
 
Based on the above the explanatory variable of GDP per capita has been imputed as 
expressed below: 
 
                                                 
117Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. regarded all their explanatory variables as time-varying variables and 
assumed that the change in variable accumulates the impact on hazard of investment over time. However, it 
should be noted that explanatory variables, like GDP per capita, change their value over time since they are 
assumed to follow a stochastic process. Because of the nature of the stochastic processes these variables 
should be regarded as continuous variables, the value of which may change independent of their absolute level 
and the change in their value does not necessarily accumulate the hazard of investment over time. (GDP per 
capita for example decreased in almost all Eastern European countries over a short period of time in the 90s 
during the 16-year period of analysis.) 
118 Figures were nominated in USD 
119 Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. measured home market attractiveness by Retail sales expectation at time t 
and by economic distance variables (like lag of GNP per capita of the host market compared to the home 
market of the retailer). In their study all explanatory variables were mean centered within counties in order to 
eliminate the impact of differences in the mean levels between countries. This analysis does not apply the 
mean centering approach and measures the impact of differences between the general macroeconomic 
indicators of the individual host countries. 
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( )
1000
GDPGDPt t
Capitaper
=  
2. Average number of inhabitants has been added to the explanatory variables of the model 
in order to assess the potential impact of economies of scale of the investment costs on 
the timing of market entry.  
In order to measure the impact of this explanatory variable significantly, the scale of 
increase in the variable was set to 10 million. 
 
Based on the above the explanatory variable of average number of inhabitants has been 
imputed as follows: 
 
000.000.10
I t t
INHABNHAB =  
 
 
The following table summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables relating to the host 
market attractiveness in the dataset120. 
 
Table 1: Host Market Attractiveness 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         gdp |       365    13.46414     4.52219       5.49     20.606 
       inhab |       366    15.60154    11.39191     5.3051    38.6497  
 
The minimum level of GDP per capita has been recorded in Romania in 1990 while its 
maximum level has been reached in the Czech Republic in 2005. The largest country in terms 
of inhabitants is Poland, which country represents ceteris paribus more than seven-times 
higher demand potential than the smallest country Slovakia. 
 
The large range in both variables measuring the host market’s attractiveness shows that the 
target countries at risk differed significantly from each other in terms of host market demand 
potential during the analysed period. 
                                                 
120GDP per capita in PPS has not been recorded by Eurostat for Hungary in year 1990 and for Slovakia in years 
1990 and 1991. 
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5.2.1.2 Competitive Presence  
 
 
The theoretic market entry models in duopoly economy showed that the evolution of rivalry 
in the new market significantly influences the speed of market entry.  
 
Competition showed an adverse impact on the timing of the market entrance since  
 
1. its anticipated level accelerated the Leader’s market entrance for [ )
LP tt
XX ;X t Î"  and 
motivated the Leader to preempt his potential competitor,  
 
2. its actual level deterred all potential Follower entries since as soon as the Leader’s 
market entry happened, the Follower’s arrival has been delayed up until 
LF tt
XX > .  
 
To assess the adverse impacts of both preemption and delay of competitors’ entry the 
explanatory variables of actual and potential rivalry has been separated in the empirical 
test.121 
 
1. Actual competitive presence at time t  has been measured by the ratio between the 
number of past entries by the end of the prior year and the number of competitors at risk.  
 
firmsofnumber
entrantsofnumber
CTCOMPET
i
t
i
å
-
==
1
0
tA  
 
 
                                                 
121Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. modeled both explanatory variables with converted U shape by assuming that 
both actual and expected competitive actions have two opposing forces of imitation and deterrence. However, 
based on the results of the theoretic market entry models, it is to observe that the dual impact of competition is 
already modeled by the opposing forces of potential and actual rivalries on the new market. Following that 
argumentation the separation of the two variables with the assumption of linear form is reasonable.  
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2. Anticipated competitive presence at time t  has been measured by the ratio of observed 
entry at time 1+t  to the number of major competitors. 122 
 
firmsofnumber
entrantsofnumberEXPCOMPET 1tt +=   
 
 
The following table summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables measuring the 
competitive presence in the dataset: 
 
Table 2: Competitive Presence 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   actcompet |       366    14.53014    7.010595          0   27.86885 
   expcompet |       366    .3583266    1.314038          0   8.196721  
 
The highest levels of both anticipated and actual competition have been recorded in Poland in 
1995 and in 2005 respectively. Poland representing the country with the largest demand 
potential was the most attractive target for western European retailers. 
 
The high volatility of both variables measuring competitive presence indicates that the level 
of competition in the host markets varied significantly across countries during the analysed 
period. 
                                                 
122 Calculation method follows the same procedure as presented by Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G.. 
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5.2.1.3 Firms’ Resources 
 
 
The analysis of asymmetric firms (Chapter 4.2) showed that “fitter” and “fatter” competitors 
have a better chance to preempt their rivals either by entering the market earlier than their 
competitors or by obtaining the Leader role with higher probability in the preemption game.  
 
Unfortunately consolidated balance sheet and profit and loss account data are not completely 
available for all retailers at risk for the whole analysed period.123  
 
To measure the impact of potential asymmetry among competitors the indicator variable of 
the retailers’ rank, calculated on the basis of the average market share of retailer in Western 
Europe in the period from 1999 to 2005 has been selected124.   
 
20051999-= rankAverageRANKt  
 
Selecting retailers’ rank as the explanatory variable of asymmetry among firms is based on 
the assumptions that  
 
· retailers with larger home market share may have better access to credit lines and cash 
reserves, generating a higher “fatness” as competitive advantage  
· retailers with larger home market share may operate more effectively (higher 
“fitness”) since they may profit from the benefits of economies of scale of fixed 
operating costs (e.g. logistic network, headquarters etc…) and may have better 
bargaining position against suppliers.  
 
                                                 
123Complete financial datasets for each year under analysis has been available only for the publicly listed 
retailers on the list, which represent ca. 20% of the selected retailers. (Analyse MAjor Databases from 
EUropean Sources, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing)  
124Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. captured the firms’ resources through the variable of consolidated deflated 
sales, which variable is the nominator of the quotient of grocery market share. However, imputing retailers’ 
ranks as indicator variables was considered to make a better possible comparison than the continuous covariate 
of consolidated deflated sales. 
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5.2.2 Expected Shape of Covariates: 
 
 
Based on the results of the theoretical market entry models the following hypotheses have 
been set up for the empirical tests. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The market entry model of the Monopoly showed that the increase of host market demand 
potential decreases the time value of waiting and accelerates investments.  
 
The explanatory variable GDPt is expected therefore to have a positive impact on the speed 
of market entry.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The comparative analysis on the impact of economies of scale of investment costs revealed 
that market entries into host markets offering better economies of scale of fixed investment 
costs (e.g. into countries with larger population) occur earlier.  
 
The explanatory variable INHABt is expected therefore to have a positive impact on the 
speed of entry.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The equilibrium analysis of endogenously given roles in Duopoly and in Oligopoly 
economies revealed that the expected entrance of rival firm(s) decreases the time value of 
waiting until the point of rent equalisation.  
 
The explanatory variable EXPCOMPETt is expected to have therefore a positive impact on 
the speed of market entry.  
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Hypothesis 4: 
The model results of the Duopoly and Oligopoly analysis showed that the Leader’s entry 
delays the arrival of the Follower(s).  
 
Consequently the explanatory variable ACTCOMPETt is expected to have a negative effect 
on the speed of market entry. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
The equilibrium analysis of asymmetric firms showed that differences in firm-specific 
factors such as operating profit and indebtedness influence the sequence of firm’s arrival 
favouring stronger (“fitter” and “fatter”) firms.  
 
As it is assumed that firm’s home market share has a positive correlation with his 
operational and financial strength, the explanatory variable RANKt is expected to have a 
negative effect on the speed of market entry and firms with higher rank (equivalent to lower 
market share in Western Europe) arrived later. 
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5.3 Description of the Dataset Used 
 
 
5.3.1 Data of the Target Countries (Countries at Risk) 
 
 
5.3.1.1 Selection Criteria 
 
 
Those Eastern European countries have been selected as potential target markets of Western 
European retailers which met the following criteria125: 
 
1. Only Eastern European countries with potential of being subject to the EU expansion 
have been considered for the analysis. The reason for adapting that criterion was to 
eliminate the impact of significant political and economic risks in the dataset.126 
 
2. Croatia has been dropped out from the list because of its involvement in the Balkan 
war, which had a significant extraordinary impact on its general market development 
in the period under analysis. 
 
3. From the remaining ten potential target countries only those have been kept on the 
final list where incumbent grocery retailers did not posses significant market shares. 
The presence of strong incumbents would distort the entry timing analysis of foreign 
retailers and could not give comparable results with those target markets which were 
untapped. Base on this criterion the following countries have been ignored in the final 
selection127: 
                                                 
125Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. traced back the entry records in the following 11 Central and Eastern 
European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Eastland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovenia and Slovakia.  
126Applying that criterion, Russia has been excluded from the set of target countries identified by Gielens, K. and 
Dekimpe, M.G. 
127The presence of significant incumbent(s) has not been considered as a selection criterion in the analysis of 
Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G.. As a consequence, these authors included the Baltic States and Slovenia as 
potential targets, assuming that they provided the same opportunity for foreign retailers as the other selected 
countries without incumbents.  
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· Slovenia, where Mercator (the Slovenian retail chain) owned more than a third 
of the grocery retail market 
· The Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, where local retailers’ market 
share (e.g. the market share of the Lithuanian VP Market and the Estonian 
ETK) exceeded 50% on the home markets  
 
 
5.3.1.2 Information Dataset 
 
 
For each selected Eastern European country the electronic database of planetretail.net covered 
the following information on active retailers: 
· retail format,  
· retail banner,  
· retail banner sales (nominated in € milion),  
· grocery retail banner sales (nominated in € milion)  
· number of stores and  
· total sales area (Sq.m.) 
 
Unfortunately information for the period between 1989 and 1998 has not been recorded 
completely in the electronic database and had to be researched manually from diverse 
planetretail.net resources and from the internet. Because of this procedure, some of the 
information covering the period of 1989-1998 may not be fully complete.  
 
Macroeconomic indicators of the selected Eastern European countries have been downloaded 
from the public website of Eurostat, the central statistical office of the EU. The following 
macroeconomic indicators have been applied in the model: 
 
· GDP per capita based on PPS128 and nominated in $. 
· Number of inhabitants 
                                                 
128Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the economic activity of the host country. It is defined as the value 
of goods and services produced less the value of any goods and services used in their creation. The volume in 
Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is expressed in relation to the European Union (EU-25) average set to equal 
100%. This method eliminates the impact of price level differences between countries and makes a meaningful 
cross country comparison of GDP possible. 
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5.3.2 Data of the Potential Entrants (Retailers at Risk) 
 
 
5.3.2.1 Selection Criteria 
 
 
Western European Grocery retailers have been regarded as potential entrants if they had at 
least 0.1% grocery retail market share in Western Europe based on their total consolidated net 
grocery sales.  
The rank of Western European grocery retailers was recorded form 1999 to 2005 in the 
planetretail.net database. As the rank of top retailers did not change significantly in the period 
from 1999 to 2005, it was assumed that the list of retailers having at least 0.1% market share 
on average in the period from 1999-2005 could be used as proxy of retailers at risk for the 
whole period under analysis. 
Based on the above presented selection criteria the following 61 Western European retailers 
have been identified as potential entrants129:  
 
Table 3: Top Western European Grocery Retailers 
Rank Name Nationality 
Grocery Market Share (%) 
(Average 1990-2005) Rank Name Nationality 
Grocery Market Share (%) 
(Average 1990-2005)
1 Carrefour Fr 7,01% 32 Dansk Supermarked DK 0,48%
2 Tesco GB 4,06% 33 SOK SE 0,46%
3 Rewe D 3,95% 34 El Corte Inglés ES 0,46%
4 Metro Group D 3,62% 35 Dagrofa DK 0,43%
5 Edeka D 3,48% 36 Co-operative Group GB 0,42%
6 ITM (Intermarché) Fr 3,39% 37 Esselunga I 0,39%
7 Aldi D 3,24% 38 Colruyt B 0,37%
8 Schwarz Group D 3,09% 39 Jerónimo Martins PT 0,36%
9 Ahold NL 2,71% 40 Reitan Norv 0,34%
10 Auchan Fr 2,57% 41 Dohle D 0,33%
11 Casino Fr 2,38% 42 Norma D 0,29%
12 Sainsburry GB 2,31% 43 Globus D 0,29%
13 leclerc Fr 2,02% 44 Caprabo ES 0,22%
14 Système U Fr 1,38% 45 Bartels-Langness D 0,22%
15 Tengelmann D 1,33% 46 BWG Ire 0,21%
16 Lekkerland D 1,11% 47 Modelo Continente PT 0,19%
17 Migros CH 1,06% 48 Finiper I 0,18%
18 Morrison GB 0,99% 49 Costcutter GB 0,16%
19 Somerfield GB 0,83% 50 Sligro NL 0,16%
20 Louis Delhaize Fr 0,79% 51 Lombardini I 0,15%
21 Mercadona ES 0,73% 52 Tradeka Fi 0,15%
22 Conad I 0,65% 53 Unide ES 0,14%
23 SPAR (Austria) D 0,64% 54 SuperBest DK 0,14%
24 NorgesGruppen Norv 0,64% 55 Denner CH 0,14%
25 Marks & Spencer GB 0,63% 56 Stonehouse GB 0,13%
26 Schlecker D 0,63% 57 Baugur GB 0,13%
27 Axel Johnson SE 0,60% 58 Sperwer NL 0,13%
28 Kesko Fi 0,59% 59 Eurospin I 0,12%
29 Delhaize Group B 0,55% 60 Bennet I 0,11%
30 Eroski ES 0,53% 61 Gadisa ES 0,11%
31 Musgrave Ire 0,49%  
                                                 
129Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. identified 75 grocery retailers as potential entrants based on their consolidated 
food sales figures in 1991. (Planetretail.net could not replicate this dataset because data were recorded in a 
different system before 1999.) As retailers at risk should define the group at risk during the whole period of 
the analysis time, the selection criteria presented above was considered to better reflect the risk set. 
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5.3.2.2 Information Dataset 
 
 
The dataset of the selected retailers includes the following information, obtained from various 
sources:  
 
· the nationality of the retailers (Source: Internet research) 
· the year of entry in each of the selected six Eastern European countries, if the market 
entry happened (Source: planetretail.net & Internet research)  
· the retail format, which was selected for the market entrance (Source: planetretail.net) 
· the rank of the retailer based on his Grocery Market Share (%) in Western Europe 
(Source: planetretail.net)130 
 
                                                 
130As only Western European retailers have been included in the risk set, grocery retailers with other nationalities 
(e.g. Wall-Mart) have been eliminated from the list.  
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5.3.3 Summary 
 
 
The dataset of the empirical test includes the entry behaviour of 61 grocery retailers into 6 
Eastern European countries from 1989 until 2005, resulting in 366 potential retailer-market 
entry combinations. 
The timing of market entry is captured in number of years elapsed between 1989 and the year 
of entry. If the market entry did not happen until 2005, which represents the last year of 
observation, the retailer-market entry combination was right censored.  
 
Of the 61 retailers included in the sample 23 entered into one or more countries with the total 
number of recorded entry amounting to 60. This result represents a total hit rate of 16.6% 
compared to the potential retailer market entry combinations. 
 
The following table summarises the entry statistics: 
 
Table 4: Number of Market Entries in Eastern Europe 
Year of entry Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Total entry
1989 1 1
1990 0
1991 3 1 4
1992 3 2 1 6
1993 1 2 3
1994 2 1 3
1995 3 3
1996 2 5 1 1 9
1997 2 4 6
1998 2 2 1 1 6
1999 1 1 2
2000 1 1 4 6
2001 1 1 2 1 5
2002 2 2
2003 0
2004 1 1 2
2005 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Total entry 4 12 9 17 9 9 60  
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5.4 Model Specification  
 
 
5.4.1 Survival Analysis  
 
 
Duration models, also called survival analysis, are statistical tests applied in the cases where 
the timing of a certain event is analyzed. Although the initial application of these models were 
in the field of medicine and engineering, more recently they have also been used in the 
research of economic and political sciences131.  
 
 
5.4.2 Basic Assumptions  
 
 
The survival time, noted by T , measures the years from 1989 until the market entrance of 
foreign retailers in one of the selected host countries of Eastern Europe. This survival time is 
considered to be a nonnegative random variable, where )(tf  denotes the density function of T 
and  
 
(1) ( ) ( )dxxftTtF
t
ò=£=
0
Pr)( denotes its cumulative distribution function. 
 
The probability that a foreign retailer has not entered an Eastern European country up until T  
is given by the following survival function: 
 
                                                 
131Some examples for empirical studies applying survival analysis in economic related research are the following 
articles: 
Gropp, R., Vesala, J. and. Vulpes, G., 2002 Equity and Bond Market Signals as leading Indicators of Bank 
Fragility, European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 150 
Sabuhoro, J. B. and Gervais, Y., 2004 Factors Determining the Success of Failure of Canadian Establishment 
on Foreign Markets: A Survival Analysis Approach, Business and Trade Statistics Field Research Paper; 
Box-Steffensmeister, J.M. and Zorn, C. J.W., 1998 Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political 
Science, Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 
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(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) )(1Pr tFdxxftTTS
t
-==>= ò
¥
 
 
The hazard function noted by )(th  and also called as the conditional failure rate, presents the 
instantaneous rate of “failure” defined as the entry of a certain retailer in one of the selected 
countries with the unit of 
t
1 . It calculates the limiting probability that the failure event occurs 
in a given time interval, condition upon the retailer having survived (having not entered the 
host market) to the beginning of that interval.  
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The proportional hazard models assume that the hazard functions of individuals in the sample 
are proportional. This means that there exists a base line hazard ( )th0 , which is modified 
multiplicatively by covariates so that the hazard function up until T  for any individual in the 
sample can be written as follows: 
 
(4) ( ) ( )bqb ,),,,( 00 xthhxth xi = ,  
 
where ( )th0  represents the hazard function assuming ( ) 1, =xx bq . The multiple noted by 
( )xx bq ,  is driven by the vector of time-varying covariates of retailer’s and host markets’ 
characteristics ( )x  and the vector of their coefficients ( )xb . 
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Depending on the nature of covariates and on the form of the survival function, survival 
analysis can be modelled in the following three forms: 
 
· Nonparametric analysis is applied, if the covariates are qualitative in nature (e.g. 
retailer rank) 
· Semiparametric analysis is used, if the covariates are quantitative but there exists no 
assumption regarding the shape of the survival function 
· Parametric analysis is chosen, if the covariates are quantitative and the shape of the 
survival function can be estimated132 
 
As the analysed dataset of the chosen empirical study is relatively small (366 observations), 
the functional form of the underlying hazard could not have been estimated and was left 
unspecified. Consequently the semi parametric modelling has been chosen for the empirical 
tests. 
                                                 
132The advantage of the semi-parametric estimation is the absence of a distribution function regarding the 
retailer’s entry dates. The parametric approaches assume a parametric model for T  and estimate the unknown 
parameters for the survivor and the hazard functions such as exponential, gamma, Weibull, lognormal, Pareto 
distribution and so on. For example in the Weibull model, a baseline hazard function, noted by ( )th0  is given 
parametrically by the function of 1-alt . 
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5.4.3 Model Specification with Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 
 
The semi parametric Cox Proportional Hazard Model133 is the most commonly used 
regression model for survival analysis, since the model does not require any assumption on 
the distribution of the underlying data. 
 
Based on the Cox model the entry rate at time t for retailer [ ]Ii ;1Î  in country [ ]Jj ;1Î  is 
given by the following hazard function: 
 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tXjiji jiXethXth ;0;; b=  
  
where  
( )tX ji;  represents a vector of time-varying covariates of retailers and of host markets, which 
are assumed to influence the timing of market entry,  
( )th0  is the baseline hazard rate and  
Xb  notes the vector of regression coefficients to be estimated in the model. 
 
The main flexibility of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model is that the model makes no 
assumption on the shape of hazard over time. It only assumes that the shape remains 
unchanged. Because of that the baseline hazard ( )th0  is not parameterised and is left 
unestimated. 
 
                                                 
133 Cox, D. R., 1976 Regression models and life-tables, Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Series B 34 
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The entry of one of the Western European retailers at risk in one of the Eastern European 
countries at risk defines the event at hazard. This definition represents a total risk set of 
JIK ´=  potential market entrance since events at hazard and the calculation of the 
regression coefficients Xb  is based on the following partial likelihood function
134: 
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where  
jic ;  equals one for the observations where the market entry has happened and zero for 
censored observations and 
å
=
K
k
kY
1
 denotes the set of potential market entrance at risk.  
 
Formula (6) is used both for data with and without ties. The observations are tied if they 
happened at the same time. As the numbers of failures in the risk group were small relative to 
the size of the group itself, ties were handled by the Breslow approximation method135. 
According to the Breslow method each event time contributes one factor to the likelihood 
function, however for tied events all events in the tie appear with the same denominator136. 
 
                                                 
134Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. applied the stratified Cox proportional approach by assuming that not all 
observations are independent but only those which occur within a given country. Their risk set was therefore 
defined on a country-by-country basis. Contrary to their approach, the risk set in this analysis is defined on the 
basis of potential market entry combinations of potential entry in selected host countries. This means that one 
retailer at risk defines six potential market entries at risk. As the entry statistic of retailers showed that retailers 
at risk were large enough to finance entries in more countries at almost the same time simultaneously, it was 
assumed that the market entry of a retailer in one country does not impact the probability of his market entry in 
another country.  
135Breslow, N.E., 1974 Covariance analysis of censored survival data, Biometrics 30 
136The Breslow approximation method for ties is also the approach which STATA applies automatically. 
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5.4.3.1 Summary 
 
 
Based on the hypothesis set up on the result of the theoretical models the hazard function of 
the Cox model is assumed to have the following functional form: 
 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttt RANKeACTCOMPETdEXPCOMPETcINHABbGDPakikiki eXthXth --++= ;0;;  
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5.5  Results and Explanations 
 
 
In this section the Cox Proportional Hazard model is tested with the model specifications 
presented under equation (7). In this section presented tables generally contain the 
exponentiated coefficients rather than the coefficients themselves for presentation purposes. 
 
 
5.5.1 Test Process 
 
 
In the first step of the testing process the model has been imputed without measuring the 
impact of asymmetry among competitors in order to test the results of the standard market 
entry model in duopoly economy presented in the first part of this work.  
Based on this the following hazard function estimate is tested in the first step: 
 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttt ACTCOMPETdEXPCOMPETcINHABbGDPakikiki eXthXth -++= ;0;;  
 
The results of parameter estimates with their relating z values are set out in the table below: 
 
Table 5: Results Standard Duopoly Model I 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of subjects =          365                     Number of obs   =       365 
No. of failures =           59 
Time at risk    =         5366 
                                                   LR chi2(4)      =    157.67 
Log likelihood  =   -264.67001                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gdp |   1.064731   .0785217     0.85   0.395     .9214371    1.230309 
       inhab |   1.077049   .0237647     3.36   0.001     1.031464    1.124649 
   actcompet |   .7639555   .0384449    -5.35   0.000     .6922018    .8431473 
   expcompet |   1.224156   .0966934     2.56   0.010     1.048581    1.429129 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
The table shows that all coefficients are significant at 1% significance level except for the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable GDP per capita. However, based on the results of the 
theoretical models it does not seem to be a realistic outcome, that the increase in host market 
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demand potential has no significant impact on the incentive of one retailer to enter a new 
Eastern European market. As a consequence the nature of GDP per capita as explanatory 
variable has been analysed carefully in the next step of the analysis. 
 
It should be observed that according to the standard model the explanatory variable of actual 
competitive presence correlates positively with the level of host market demand potential. The 
reason for the correlation is that the increase in host market demand potential accelerates the 
Leader(s)’s entry. As actual competition is assumed to deter further entries, the explanatory 
variable GDP per capita has not only a direct positive but it also needs to have an indirect 
negative impact on the speed of entry at the same time. 
 
In order to handle the dual impact of GDP per capita properly in the empirical test the 
following new explanatory variable has been created to replace the original variable tGDP  in 
the further analysis: 
 
1
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The change in variable tKETSHAREAVERAGEMAR  expresses properly the staggered impact 
of GDP per capita by reflecting the balance between the increase in host market demand 
potential and in the intensity of competition.  
The increase in GDP per capita is expected to have a positive impact on the event at hazard 
only in the cases where its growth is ahead of the increase in competition, providing excess 
host market demand for new entries. The level of actual competition in the denominator of the 
variable expresses the inverse impact and decreases the speed of entry in the cases where the 
development of host market demand potential does not keep pace with the increase in actual 
competition.  
                                                 
137The number of competitors already present in the given market has been increased by one in order to 
differentiate between markets without entry and markets with one Western European retailer. The ratio of 
tKETSHAREAVERAGEMAR  expresses in this way one unit of potential host market demand potential which 
an additional retailer could obtain if he enters the market. GDP per capita has been not multiplied by the 
number of inhabitants as the impact of this variable is measured separately. 
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Based on the previous argumentation the hazard function is tested in the following modified 
functional form: 
 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttt ACTCOMPETdEXPCOMPETcINHABbKETSHAREAVERAGEMARakikiki eXthXth -++= ;0;;  
 
The table below presents the results of parameter estimates with their relating z values after 
replacing variable tGDP  with the new variable tKETSHAREAVERAGEMAR : 
 
Table 6: Results Standard Duopoly Model II 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of subjects =          365                     Number of obs   =       365 
No. of failures =           59 
Time at risk    =         5366 
                                                   LR chi2(4)      =    174.15 
Log likelihood  =   -256.42884                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       inhab |   1.065782   .0170851     3.97   0.000     1.032816      1.0998 
   actcompet |   .8395233   .0254191    -5.78   0.000     .7911522    .8908518 
averagemar~e |   1.426851   .1173163     4.32   0.000     1.214486     1.67635 
   expcompet |   1.336678   .0967753     4.01   0.000     1.159845    1.540471 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
The results show that the new variable reflecting the staggered impact of host market demand 
potential became significant at 1% significance level. Moreover the estimates of coefficients 
and their z-values give strong evidence that the selected variables significantly differ from 
zero and influence strongly the speed of market entrance, while the signals of their 
coefficients agree to the model specification of equation (9). 
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The analysis of oligopoly economy showed, that the positive strategic impact of competition 
softens with the increase in the number of competitors in certain cases. Moreover it was also 
observed that the increase in the number of potential entrants decreases the probability of 
getting the Leader role and mitigates the firms’ incentive to invest.  
 
To test the complete strategic impact of competition empirically the explanatory variable of 
tEXPCOMPET  can be parameterised with quadratic relationship to allow for a potential 
converted U shape. Accordingly the following new explanatory variable has been added to the 
model in the next step of the analysis: 
 
( ) 2tt 22 Ù= EXPCOMPETEXPCOMPET  
 
Adding this new explanatory variable to the model the hazard function has been tested in the 
following modified functional form: 
 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttt ACTCOMPETdEXPCOMPETeEXPCOMPETcINHABbKETSHAREAVERAGEMARakikiki eXthXth --++=
2
;0;;  
 
The table below sets out the results obtained by allowing for quadratic relationship for the 
intensity of expected competition as an explanatory variable: 
 
Table 7: Results Oligopoly Model 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of subjects =          365                     Number of obs   =       365 
No. of failures =           59 
Time at risk    =         5366 
                                                   LR chi2(5)      =    183.10 
Log likelihood  =   -251.95203                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       inhab |   1.060262   .0164879     3.76   0.000     1.028434    1.093076 
   actcompet |    .857566   .0263637    -5.00   0.000     .8074201    .9108263 
averagemar~e |     1.3677   .1140029     3.76   0.000     1.161556     1.61043 
   expcompet |   2.344534   .4740438     4.21   0.000     1.577434    3.484672 
  expcompet2 |   .9247124   .0246219    -2.94   0.003      .877692    .9742519 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
The results reveal that all variables have been proved to be significant at 1% significance 
level. Moreover the result of the likelihood ratio test shows that the addition of the quadratic 
explanatory variable has improved the goodness-of-fit of the model significantly. Since the 
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exponentiated coefficient of the explanatory variable t2EXPCOMPET  is below one, the 
quadratic relationship has been proved to have a converted U shape.  
 
To better understand the quadratic impact of expected competition, the exponentiated 
coefficients have been replaced by the coefficients themselves in the following table: 
 
Table 8: Results Oligopoly Model (exp. coefficients) 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of subjects =          365                     Number of obs   =       365 
No. of failures =           59 
Time at risk    =         5366 
                                                   LR chi2(5)      =    183.10 
Log likelihood  =   -251.95203                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       inhab |   .0585164   .0155508     3.76   0.000     .0280374    .0889954 
   actcompet |  -.1536571   .0307424    -5.00   0.000    -.2139111    -.093403 
averagemar~e |   .3131307   .0833537     3.76   0.000     .1497605     .476501 
   expcompet |   .8520865   .2021911     4.21   0.000     .4557992    1.248374 
  expcompet2 |  -.0782725   .0266266    -2.94   0.003    -.1304596   -.0260854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
The maximum point at which the impact of expected competition changes direction from 
being incentive to being deterring can be estimated based on the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables tEXPCOMPET  and t2EXPCOMPET . The quadratic function has its 
maximum at 
e
cx
2
-
=  where e  represents the coefficient of the quadratic term and c  denotes 
the coefficient of the linear term as presented in equation (10).  
 
Replacing the coefficients’ results presented in table (8) into that formula the maximum of the 
quadratic function is obtained at 5.5% of the total retailers at risk. This result means that if the 
number of retailers expected to invest in one of the given countries under analysis in the next 
year was above 3138, then the hazard of Western European retailers’ market entry into that 
country in the given year started to decrease. This is very close to the result of the theoretical 
analysis which showed that the earliest first market entry occurs in a duopoly economy139. 
Having parameterised the standard market entry model with explanatory variables of Host 
market attractiveness and of Competitive presence, the explanatory variable of retailer rank 
                                                 
138This result has been calculated as the 5,5% of the 61 retailers at risk. 
139It needs to be observed that the explanatory variable tEXPCOMPET  measures the impact of competition 
not only on the first arrival but for all investors’ entries. 
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tRANK  is added to the model for measuring the impact of Firms’ resources in the final step 
of the analysis. The hazard function has been tested in the following functional form: 
 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttt RANKfACTCOMPETdEXPCOMPETeEXPCOMPETcINHABbKETSHAREAVERAGEMARakikiki eXthXth ---++=
2
;0;;  
 
The following tables set out the results of parameter estimates with their relating z values for 
the complete model first with exponentiated coefficients then with the coefficients 
themselves: 
 
Table 9: Results Oligopoly Model with Asymmetric Firms 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of subjects =          365                     Number of obs   =       365 
No. of failures =           59 
Time at risk    =         5366 
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =    195.35 
Log likelihood  =   -245.83024                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       inhab |   1.054918   .0164994     3.42   0.001      1.02307    1.087757 
   actcompet |   .8701946   .0270592    -4.47   0.000     .8187434    .9248792 
averagemar~e |   1.298364    .106709     3.18   0.001     1.105194    1.525297 
   expcompet |   2.118235   .4214959     3.77   0.000     1.434162      3.1286 
  expcompet2 |   .9341985    .024727    -2.57   0.010     .8869701    .9839417 
retailerrank |   .9675024   .0096987    -3.30   0.001     .9486788    .9866996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
Table 10: Results Oligopoly Model with Asymmetric Firms (exp. coefficients) 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of subjects =          365                     Number of obs   =       365 
No. of failures =           59 
Time at risk    =         5366 
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =    195.35 
Log likelihood  =   -245.83024                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       inhab |   .0534631   .0156405     3.42   0.001     .0228083    .0841179 
   actcompet |  -.1390384   .0310956    -4.47   0.000    -.1999846   -.0780922 
averagemar~e |    .261105   .0821873     3.18   0.001     .1000209     .422189 
   expcompet |   .7505833   .1989844     3.77   0.000      .360581    1.140586 
  expcompet2 |  -.0680663   .0264687    -2.57   0.010     -.119944   -.0161886 
retailerrank |  -.0330373   .0100245    -3.30   0.001     -.052685   -.0133897 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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As the tables present, all parameters are significant at 1% of significance level and the results 
of the likelihood ratio test assure that the addition of the explanatory variable tRANK  
improved the goodness-of-fit of the model. 
 
In accordance with the expectations, weaker firms proved to arrive significantly later as the 
probability of entering the Eastern European markets decreased by 3.3% with the increase of 
the grocery retailer’s rank on the Western European market. 
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5.5.2 Summary of the Results 
 
 
The final results of the empirical test analysing the entry behaviour of 61 selected Western 
European retailers into 6 identified Eastern European target countries are to be interpreted 
ceteris paribus as follows: 
 
· The number of foreign retailers’ entry in the Eastern European countries per year 
increased by 5.5 % on average with every 10 million more inhabitants of the host 
country. 
 
· Increase of the GDP per capita by USD 1,000 (without any further grocery retailer’s 
entry) accelerated the annual rate of foreign retailer’s arrival by 29.8%. 140 
 
· The total impact of actual competitive presence on the speed of market entry consists 
of the following two components.  
1. One more additional active retailer in the host markets decreased the annual entry 
rate of foreign retailers by 2.1%. This result was calculated by dividing the 13% 
decrease in variable tACTCOMPET  by 6.1 which is the equivalent value of 1% 
increase in the retailers’ number.  
2. In addition to this impact the increase in actual competition by one more active 
retailer on the host market reduced the entry rate by a further 23% through the 
variable of tKETSHAREAVERAGEMAR  assuming no change in the GDP per 
capital figures141.  
Based on these results one more competitor on the host market reduced the rate of 
foreign retailers’ entry per year by 25.1% on average in the analysed period. 
 
· Up until 3 additional retailers expected to arrive in the next year the probability of an 
additional retailer’s entry in the given year increased. In the case of more than 3 
expected additional entrants this probability decreased at an increasing rate. 
                                                 
140It should be noted that USD 1,000 increase in the GDP per capita presents a significant jump in the 
explanatory variable as its mean was USD 13,464 across countries in the period under analysis.  
141The impact has been obtained by calculating the reciprocal value of the exponentiated coefficients of 
tKETSHAREAVERAGEMAR . 
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· Retailers possessing larger market share in Western Europe appeared sooner in 
Eastern Europe by 3.3% higher probability on average compared to competitors with 
one rank behind.  
 
The historical entry pattern of Western European retailers in Eastern Europe reflects the 
existence of a three to four-year period of opportunity for retailers’ entry.  
Czech Republic and Hungary were the first target countries of Western European retailers 
mainly due to their relative high level of GDP per capita at the beginning of the 90s. (In 1991 
and 1992 GDP per capita was above USD 8,000 in Hungary and above USD 11,000 in the 
Czech Republic, while GDP per capita in the other countries of the region were around USD 
6,000 or below.) Moreover, reflecting the strong impact of GDP per capita on foreign 
retailers’ entry rate, even Hungary and the Czech Republic showed significant differences in 
foreign retailers’ entry rate during these years; 3 retailers per year invested in the Czech 
Republic compared to 1 to 2 retailer entries per year in Hungary. 
In terms of GDP per capita Poland showed approximately 3-year time lag compared to 
Hungary during the 90s. However, in the middle of the 90s the number of Western European 
retailers entering Poland per year was approximately two-times the number of retailers 
entering Hungary 3 years before. This significant difference was mainly driven by the nearly 
four-times higher population of Poland which not only presented a higher absolute demand 
potential but also increased threat of preemptive competitors’ entry for foreign retailers. 
By the end of the 90s the most prosperous retail markets in the region (Poland, Czech 
Republic and Hungary) were all saturated, resulting that late entrants were either unable to 
capture significant market share or were forced to leave. (Edeka for example entered the 
Czech Republic in 2000 and exited in 2004.) However, Bulgaria and Romania represented 
further investment opportunities for foreign retailers since GDP per capita in these countries 
was still below USD 10,000 in 2005 and the number of foreign retailers’ presence showed a 
relative low level to the region’s other countries compared at the same level of demand 
potential.  
Although Eastern European retail markets opened to all foreign investors simultaneously, not 
all of them grabbed the opportunities to the same extent. Retailers’ relative strength to each 
other proved to be a significant driver of geographical market entry. Leading market players 
in Western Europe (Carrefour, Tesco, REWE and Metro Group) entered almost all Eastern 
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European countries, while none of the retailers with a home market share rank of above 30 
entered more than three countries out of six. 
 
The results of the empirical tests verified the hypotheses, which were set up on the basis of 
equilibrium outcomes obtained from the theoretical market entry models.  
The results show that driven by the development of demand potential on the host markets and 
by the intensity of competition, foreign retailers had a limited period of time - defined as the 
“window of opportunity” - to carry out their market entry. Western European retailers needed 
to use these strategically important years in Eastern Europe to preempt their competitors and 
to get the strategic first-mover-advantage on the new markets.  
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5.5.3 Robustness of the Results 
 
 
5.5.3.1 Estimate of the Cumulative Hazard 
 
 
The final results are presented by graphing the estimate of the cumulative hazard function for 
the 16-year period under analysis applying the Nelson142 and Aalen143 estimator. The Nelson-
Aalen estimator has been chosen to test the model since it has a better small sample property 
than the Kaplan-Meier144 estimator. 
 
Chart 18: Estimate of Cumulative Hazard 
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The above graph shows visually how the hazard of entry in one of the Eastern European 
countries of one of the selected Western European retailers at risk has grown on average over 
the 16-year period under analysis from 1989 until 2005. 
                                                 
142Nelson, W.,1972 Theory and application of hazard plotting for censored failure data, Technometrics 14 
143Aalen, O.O.,1978 Nonparametric inference for the family of counting processes; Annals of Statistics 6 
144Kaplan, E.L. and Meier, P., 1958 Nonparametric estimation from incomplete observations, Journal of 
American Statistical Association 53 
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5.5.3.2 Functional Form of Covariates 
 
 
The functional forms of the covariates have been tested by the use of martingale residuals145.  
A smooth plot of martingale residuals versus the covariate itself indicates the proper 
functional form of the covariate146. 
 
As the following charts present this criterion is fulfilled for the covariate of every variable 
included in the final model.  
 
Chart 19: Proportional Hazard Assumption Variable tINHAB  
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145Martingale residuals are simply calculated as the difference between the observed number of market entry in 
the dataset and the number of market entry, which the model predicts based on its functional form and 
estimated coefficients. 
146It can be shown that martingale residuals have a linear relationship with the functional form of the covariate, 
where the linear constant depends on the number of censored observations. Consequently a smooth plot of 
martingale residuals versus the single covariate indicates the proper functional form of the covariate vector. 
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Chart 20: Proportional Hazard Assumption Variable tKETSHAREAVERAGEMAR  
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Chart 21: Proportional Hazard Assumption Variable tACTCOMPET  
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Chart 22: Proportional Hazard Assumption Variable tEXPCOMPET  
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Chart 23: Proportional Hazard Assumption Variable t2EXPCOMPET  
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Chart 24: Proportional Hazard Assumption Variable tRANK  
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5.5.3.3 Goodness of Fit 
 
 
The overall model fit has been tested by using the Cox-Snell (1968) residuals147. If the Cox 
regression model fits the data, then the Cox-Snell residuals have a standard exponential 
distribution with hazard function equal to one for all t  and the cumulative hazard of the Cox-
Snell residual forms a straight 45° line. 
 
As presented by the chart below, the Cox model fits the data properly:  
 
Chart 25: Goodness of Fit 
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147The Cox-Snell residuals are defined for the ith observation as follows: 
( ) xxior ii etHCS
ÙÙ
= b , where both ( )io tH
Ù
 and x
Ù
b  are obtained from the Cox model with the estimated values 
of coefficients in the tested functional form. STATA predicts the Cox-Snell residuals from saved martingale 
residuals.  
Cox, D.R. and Snell, E.J., 1968 A general definition of residuals (with discussion) Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B 30  
  
6 Conclusions 
 
 
This work has examined the impact of host market uncertainty and competition on firm’s 
market entry decisions. Both the theoretical and the empirical results showed that real world 
investment opportunities force investors to make their decision as part of a strategic 
equilibrium with their competitors, which do not allow one investor to formulate the 
investment strategy in isolation.  
 
The theoretic models presented that market entrance might be carried out sequentially or 
simultaneously, depending on the underlying market conditions of the host market and on the 
relative strength of investors to each other.  
The standard duopoly model presented the impact of competition and common economic 
factors on the market entry of firms and showed that the threat of preemption accelerates the 
market entry and forces rent equalisation.  
The extension of the standard model investigated how the entry barrier of a late arrival, or the 
asymmetry among competitors affect the equilibrium outcome of the standard model. It was 
found that while the entry barrier of the Follower makes the competition among the firms 
tougher, the comparative strength of one firm always weakens the competition and eliminates 
the rent equalisation. Both the theoretical and the empirical analysis proved that stronger 
firms have better chances to enter earlier and become the Leader on new markets. However, 
the theoretical results indicate that common economic factors such as host market’s volatility 
or growth potential can mitigate the competitive advantage of the stronger firm providing a 
chance for the weaker competitor to catch-up in the race for new markets. 
As the likelihood of successful entry increases with the competitive advantage of one firm, it 
is not surprising that early entrants prefer host markets with close location and similar cultural 
features. This explains why “national regions” of Western retailers emerged in the early stage 
of the internationalisation of the Eastern European grocery retail sales market as a result of 
which German retailers invested relative quickly in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary; 
French retailers rushed into Romania among the first investors, while the British giant Tesco 
arrived relatively late in all Eastern European markets148. 
                                                 
148Gielens, K. and Dekimpe, M.G. concluded that Western European retailers monitored especially their home 
market rivals as a result of which moves made by one firm’s home rivals were more carefully followed than 
actions of rivals with other nationality. The results of the theoretic market entry model with asymmetric 
competitors reveal that firms should look for opportunities where they can benefit the most from their 
comparative advantage. This result may deliver a better explanation for the observed behavior. 
Conclusion  
 147 
The extension of the standard duopoly model to the case of oligopoly economy showed that 
the increase in the number of potential market entrants can mitigate the positive strategic 
impact of competition in some cases and delays the occurrence of first investments compared 
to the duopoly case. This result may be of importance in the cases of privatisation processes 
advising that the number of selected bidders needs to be kept small if the seller wants private 
investments to occur as soon as possible in a certain sector/geographic market149. 
 
This work could be extended in various ways. One very interesting extension could be to 
introduce incomplete information into the model, assuming that firms only know their own 
profit realisation but they have no information (or limited information) on their opponent’s 
capabilities. Another interesting field of further research could be to measure how exactly the 
change in common macroeconomic factors of the host market substitutes for the comparative 
disadvantage of one firm. Lambrecht (2001) for example concluded that these factors may 
change the order of debt financed firm’s market exit. 
 
As the globalisation process becomes more intensive, the race for investment opportunities 
including those of entering new markets becomes tougher. This process, like competition by 
nature, favours stronger firms and projects that investors will face stronger competition even 
in their home markets in the future. It is therefore vital for the investors to understand all 
aspects of market entry games, in order to remain successful players in these strategic 
investments.  
This was also one of the strategic lessons, which Sun Tzu emphasised to be worth 
consideration on the “Art of war” more than 2500 years ago: 
 
“What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in wining with 
ease. … (and) who looks below the surface of things wins with ease.” 
                                                 
149Furthermore it is also advised to select even number of bidders in such processes based on the results of 
Chapter 4.3. 
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